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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis stems from a vast body of literature on 
affective assessment (Rychlak, 1988, chap. 9). As such, it 
has two goals. First, the writer intends to replicate the 
findings of the previous affective assessment studies by 
employing a sentence-completion methodology that has not 
been used previously. Second, the writer hopes that this 
thesis will advance the understanding of affective assess-
ment as a top-down process involving organization of ma-
terial into the context of an overriding conceptual catego-
ry. This latter goal draws on the tenets of logical learn-
ing theory (LLT) (ibid., chaps. 7-9). 
Before proceeding further, an explanation of the term 
"affect" as it is used in conjunction with "affective predi-
cation" is necessary. The writer wishes to distinguish his 
proposed meaning of "affect" from that which is espoused by 
the mood induction studies in Bower's (1981) tradition. In 
the latter case, affect is to be understood as a physiologi-
cal state, synonymous with emotion or mood. In the context 
of research on affective assessment/predication, affect 
signifies a purely cognitive evaluative construct, opera-
tionally defined as an idiographic rating of an item on a 
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"like -dislike" dimension of meaning. In earlier research 
on LLT, the score along this dimension was termed reinforce-
ment value (RV). Thus, RV is the operationalized measure of 
a subject's affective assessment of literally anything in 
his/her experience. In this sense, affect is similar to the 
osgoodian (Osgood, 1952) evaluative dimension on the seman-
tic differential scale. It is this Osgoodian interpretation 
of the term that Fiske and Taylor (1984) refer to as the 
"fourth code," noting that its role in cognition is yet to 
be deciphered. 
Another issue that must be addressed at this time is 
the distinction between the terms "meaning" and "meaningful-
ness." According to Rychlak (1988, pp. 51-57), meaning is a 
construct signifying a pattern of relations between items, 
as well as "the relation between a user of such meaningful 
ties and the items he/she employs for understanding." 
(ibid., p. 57). Thus, the meaning of the word "dog" 
includes the superordinate relations such as categories to 
which it belongs like "animals" and "pets." It may also 
include features such as "big brown eyes," and "fur." In 
addition, the meaning of the word dog may encompass its 
symbolic significance "loyalty." 
The meaningfulness refers to the latter part of the 
definition of meaning, one that highlights the relation bet-
ween the person doing the understanding and the item 
he/she understands. Rychlak defines meaningfulness as "a 
measure of the extent of meaning i.e., clarity, cen-
trality, import, value-- the item holds for the individual" 
(ibid., p. 57). The RV measure mentioned above is thus one 
of the operationalizations of meaningfulness, henceforth 
referred to as affective meaningfulness. 
The central theoretical claim made in this paper is 
that meaningfulness (as defined by affective assessment) 
effects cognition in the top-down fashion. Specifically, 
the present experiment investigates the effect of meaning-
fulness in learning. The postulate here is that once the 
affective judgment rendered by an individual in relation to 
an item is known, one can predict what items that in-
dividuals is more likely to learn. 
3 
This contrasts with the typical "association value" 
interpretation of meaningfulness in verbal learning studies 
that conceptualize the effects of meaningfulness in the 
"bottom-up" fashion. Here, meaningfulness is a measure of 
the subject's familiarity with a given item, a formulation 
that relies on the assumptions of a frequency and/or con-
tiguity principle to account for the patterning of meaning. 
As such, any explanation of the obtained effects of meaning-
fulness must ultimately refer to the nomothetic mediating 
influences external to the person as idiographic evaluator, 
and thus inherently input driven. 
The first chapter of this thesis is dedicated to the 
discussion of the theoretical assumptions held by th~ models 
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that base their explanation of cognition on the frequency/-
contiguity principles. Based on the terminology suggested 
by Rychlak (1988, chap. 3), these models will be referred to 
as Lockean models -- a nomenclature that reflects their 
philosophical and historical origins. This discussion will 
center around the assumptions pertaining to the causation of 
mental phenomenon as they are conveyed by the Lockean for-
mulation of association. A number of current cognitive 
models will be discussed in light of these assumptions as 
well as their explanations of affect and meaningfulness. 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to place the construct of 
affective assessment within a historical-theoretical frame-
work. Again, using Rychlak's (ibid.) terminology, the 
construct of affective assessment reflects the Kantian theme 
in psychological explanation. Thus, the issue to be ad-
dressed here is what constitutes this line of philosophical 
theorizing, and how is it different from the philosophical 
development of the association models. The explication of 
the differences between these models will be focused upon by 
the relation of an individual to the presented stimuli. As 
I will argue, according to the Kantian model, an individual 
is regarded as an active conceptualizer of his/her ex-
perience, rather than a passive recipient of environmental 
stimuli. A predicational model proposed by Rychlak (ibid., 
chap. 7) to capture such active conceptualization of 
experience will be presented. 
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A review of literature beginning with the early re-
search on affective meaningfulness which established the 
role of affective assessment in learning and stresses its 
orthogonality with association value will be presented next. 
studies that lend support to the formulation of affective 
meaningfulness in terms of the predicational model will also 
be taken up. 
The present project differs from previous research in 
two respects. First, sentences are used as experimental 
stimuli. Second, the affective valence is measured nomo-
thetically by relying on inter-rater agreement. The present 
methodology employs a sentence completion task in which 
subjects must complete sentences lacking a predicate, ad-
ministered following a learning trial. Given the evidence 
that suggests the commencement of affective predication at 
the initiation of cognition, subjects are expected to know 
the affective valence of the predicate before the "word" 
meaning per se. of that predicate is fully known. Thus, in 
a sentence such as "When solving problems, John is fast," 
subjects would be able to state that the predicate is posi-
tive in affective meaningfulness before they could think of 
a synonym to "fast" -- such as "swift." 
CHAPTER II 
THE LOCKEAN MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
As suggested in the introduction, Rychlak (1988, chap. 
3) identifies what he calls the Lockean tradition in 
psychology, named after John Locke, although this style of 
though goes back to ancient philosophy (e.g., Democritus). 
It is fair to say that the term "Lockean tradition" is 
tantamount to "British empiricism." The influence of 
British empiricism in psychology is indisputable. The Lock-
ean position was adopted early in the historical development 
of scientific psychology, and it became dominant with the 
advance of American psychology in the early part of the 
twentieth century (ibid., chaps. 3 and 4). Its influence 
did not wane. Referring to the recent domain of cognitive 
psychology, Bourne, Ekstrand, and Dominowski (1971) state 
that British empiricism "is the movement which gave the 
psychology of learning and thinking most of its important 
problems and defined its essential content" (p. 21). 
More often than not, the references made to British 
empiricism are made in the context of association theory 
(see ibid., chap. 1; Tarter, 1988, chap. 1; Chaplin & Kra-
wiec, 1974, chap. 1). But, the term "association" per se. 
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was first used by Aristotle to ref er to the relationships 
between items in the memory (Rychlak, 1988, chap. 3, Ander-
son & Bower, 1979, chap. 2). According to these authors, 
the British empiricists imposed a theoretically limited 
interpretation of association. 
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As such, the construct of association serves as an 
excellent starting point for the analysis of the theoretical 
assumptions held by the Lockean tradition. As will be 
asserted shortly, the essence of the limitation upon the 
explication of association mentioned above entails the 
understanding of the relations between items exclusively in 
terms of "efficient cause" (Rychlak, 1988, chap. 3). Such a 
narrow interpretation of association in terms of efficient 
cause further infuses other assumptions into the theoretical 
framework which include conjectures regarding human nature 
and the relationship between past and present events. 
Besides the already alluded to task of expounding the philo-
sophical assumptions of the Lockean tradition, this chapter 
intends to illustrate the influences of these assumptions in 
the current models of cognition and to show their effects in 
the contemporary understanding of affect and meaningfulness. 
The purpose here is to set the stage for the theoretical 
critique of the Lockean tradition. 
Efficient Cause and Association 
The foremost theoretical assumption of the Lockean 
tradition is that most observed relations can be explained 
by the efficient cause. The efficient cause is the cause/ 
effect relationship occurring when an antecedent elicits a 
consequent within a temporal order. In other words, it is 
motion over time (see Rychlak, 198la, Introduction). 
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This emphasis on efficient cause explanation of the 
relationships is evident in a thrust toward identification 
of antecedents found in the work by the British empiricists. 
David Hume, for instance, suggested contiguity, resemblance 
and cause and effect as his principle of association 
(Boring, 1950, p. 191). David Hartley added repetition 
(ibid., p. 197) -- a frequency construct. James Mill con-
tributed vividness (ibid., p. 224) in addition to contiguity 
and frequency, and John Stuart Mill extended the list of 
possible antecedents with similarity, intensity and in-
separability (ibid., p. 229). As such, we find these 
antecedents at the origin of a causal event. They provide 
an impetus that sets the causal progression in motion. The 
Lockean tradition further assumes that these antecedents 
originate in the environment and thus effect the mental 
events through experience by way of sensory input. As-
sociation can be viewed as the consequence of these antece-
dents. For instance, it is not uncommon in psychology to 
say that two items become associated due to frequency of 
their co-occurrence. Yet, this statement stops short of 
disclosing the complete picture. The postulated association 
between two items is not an end in itself, rather it. is a 
causal explanation of some other obtained effect such as a 
probability of one item being generated given the other. 
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The latter is the lawful consequent of the antecedent, while 
association is the representation of the "motion over time" 
between an antecedent and a consequent, and thus a 
relational construct. It is, in the words of Hume (cited by 
Anderson & Bower, 1979, p. 24). the "gentle force that com-
monly prevails" (italics added). 
Related Philosophical Assumptions 
Thus, according to the causal scheme laid out so far, 
the environmental antecedents set forth the lawful progres-
sion towards the specific consequents. The dogma of 
environmental determinism logically follows the assumption 
of efficient causation. Since the antecedent of a causal 
event originates in the environment, it is in the environ-
ment where one can trace the origins of all effects. 
The route from a given environmental antecedent to an 
observed consequent is not necessarily direct. The British 
empiricists distinguish between simple and complex ideas 
(Chaplin & Krawiec, 1974, chap. 1). The simple ideas are 
direct inputs from the environment through sensory modali-
ties, while the complex ideas represent aggregation of 
simple ideas previously experienced. The process of the 
aggregation of simple ideas into complex ones does not 
change the fundamental principles of causation postulated by 
the British empiricists. As the term "aggregation" sug-
gests, this process is an additive, constitutive process. 
In Hume's example (cited by Anderson & Bower, 1979, p.23) 
for instance, an idea of a "house" is composed of a sum 
consisting of items such as "doors," "windows," and so on, 
in the same way a real house in composed of bricks. 
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Hence, the explanation of any complex phenomenon ultimately 
rests in the understanding of its constituent parts, which 
according to the Lockean formulation, ultimately originate 
in the direct experience of the environment. As a result, 
the notion of environmental determinism is reaffirmed even 
in the cases were direct progression of causation is not ex-
plicit. Furthermore, here we find the basis for reduc-
tionism, since the complex can be explained in terms its 
constituent parts. Note, that the temporal order of the 
relation between the simple and complex ideas parallels that 
of efficient causation. Like antecedents, simple ideas are 
always first in the temporal order. These principles serve 
as a foundation for the mediational modeling, that prevails 
in psychological theory (see below). 
In this causal scheme, an individual is delegated a 
strictly passive role -- that of a tabula rasa. Namely, 
he/she does not actively intercede in the causal scheme of 
things, but rather registers its effects. In the case of 
more complex causal relations, the previous "inscriptions" 
upon the tabula rasa serve to direct the new causal rela-
11 
tions. 
Implications of the Lockean Tradition in Psychology 
The adaptation of British empiricism by psychologists 
coincided with the advance of psychology as a scientific 
discipline. On the surface, the scientific method appears 
to rest upon the Lockean view of causation, because the pro-
cedure of validating a hypothesis follows the temporal order 
implied by the efficient cause. The antecedents lend them-
selves well to the interpretation as the independent vari-
ables (IV), and the observable consequences as the dependent 
variables (DV). But, in equating the Lockean tradition with 
scientific method, one is confounding theory with method 
(Rychlak, 1968, chap. 8). 
The problem lies in the interpretation of the causal 
relation intervening between IV and DV, in fact, in the de-
finition of association. For instance, assume that we want 
to test a hypothesis that associative strength between items 
facilitates learning. The null hypothesis tested here is 
that "strength of association will not facilitate learning," 
and the experimental hypothesis may be stated as follows: 
"If items are highly associated, then they will be easier to 
learn." This logical proposition in itself does not state 
anything about the nature of the causal relation between IV 
(i.e.,the degree of association) and DV (i.e, measure of 
learning rates). According to Meehl 
(1990), this consideration of the causal relation can be at-
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tributed to the interpretative context of the theory tested. 
Thus, the possible interpretation of this relation in terms 
of efficient causation (i.e., facilitation occurs because 
strongly associated items elicit one another) is post hoc 
and reflects a philosophical bias rather than a conclusion 
based on results. Rychlak refers to this as an S-R bind: 
"limiting one's theoretical conceptions to an efficient-
cause frame" (Rychlak, 1981b, p. 516). In fact, one can 
further delimit the historically acceptable interpretation 
of results chiefly to the consequences of the frequency and 
contiguity principles among the antecedents mentioned above. 
(Bugaj & Rychlak, 1989). Thus, the meaning of association 
in psychology is even narrower than that allowed by the 
British empiricists -- not only is it an efficient cause 
relation, but it is also a relation due to the specified 
antecedent. 
A clear example of this efficient cause formulation of 
association as due to the frequency and contiguity 
principles is found in the verbal learning measures of 
associative strength that are used to account for the 
relatedness of verbal items. Derived by averaging responses 
on a free association task, the metric of associative 
strength was thought to reflect the actual frequency of the 
items' co-occurrence in a given environment (Deese, 
1962). considering the stated purpose to "remove computa-
tion inadequacies of S-R theories" (Anderson, 1983, p. 6) 
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such as verbal learning, it is therefore not surprising that 
cognitive models retain frequency and contiguity principles 
in their causal assumptions pertaining to the explanation of 
semantic relations. For instance, Wyer and Carlson (1979) 
proposed a network model in which the degree of relatedness 
between "nodes" that represent various concepts is 
determined by the frequency and the recency of activation of 
a pathway uniting the two. Wyer and Carlson further suggest 
that the "strength of association" between the nodes is a 
function of the "diameter" of a path between them, that 
becomes thicker when frequently activated. According to Mc-
Clelland's (1988) model, the so-called "connections" between 
the items are assigned weights that are adjusted based on 
the frequency of their activation. As more weight is 
assigned to a given pathway, there is a greater probability 
that activation will take that route. Collins and Loftus 
(1975) also view semantic relations as the network of 
associative pathways connecting different nodes representing 
meanings. In their model, the spread of activation is 
determined by the length of a postulated associative link, 
as well as the diversity of associative links connecting one 
node to another in the network. 
Considering the distinction between association as the 
relation between items and association as the 
"gentle force," the postulated "links" or "pathways" between 
nodes can be seen as representing the former. On the other 
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hand, the activation construct used by these models takes 
from the latter. Here, an assumed force is actually 
traveling or spreading within a postulated cognitive struc-
ture, and the direction as well as the strength of this 
force is determined by the frequency and contiguity prin-
ciples. 
Underlying the reliance on frequency and contiguity 
principles is the assumption that associations formed due to 
the effect of these antecedents are directly based on 
sensory experience, and thus can be used to explain more 
complex relations such as similarity and/or categorization. 
For instance, Underwood, Ekstrand, and Keppel (1965) use the 
strength of association construct to explain similarity in 
terms of conceptual relations as associations of various 
items to the same category name. The feature based model of 
similarity (Tversky, 1977) also inherently relies on 
frequency/contiguity principles -- at least in explaining 
how features become associated with given concepts before 
they enter into the process of comparison to derive "sim-
ilarity" (see Medin, 1989, for review and criticism of the 
application of this model to concept formation). In either 
case, the relationship between associations based on fre-
quency/contiguity principles and the more general concepts 
of similarity and category is reminiscent of the relation-
ship between simple and complex ideas. 
Thus, the type of explanation offered by the Lockean 
15 
models for the more complex phenomenon is that of mediation, 
defined as any type of cognitive modeling that relies on 
past experiences to account for a complex phenomenon (Bugaj 
& Rychlak, 1989). The simple associations, those formed due 
to sensory input of frequency/contiguity, must already be 
inscribed upon the "tabula rasa" in order for the process of 
aggregating them into the complex ideas can take place. 
This type of theorizing highlights the reductionism of the 
Lockean models and affirms the assumption of the environmen-
tal determinism. With diligence, one can trace the cause 
of all effects to the environmental input that determines 
the course of causal progression leading to a given output 
no matter how complex that final output is. Within this 
theoretical framework, the role of an individual remains as 
passive as it was in the days of early behaviorism. The 
zeitgeist has not changed; it is still Lockean. What did 
change with time was the metaphor describing an individual, 
in the direction of being more "attuned" with the 
technological advances. For instance, John Watson saw an 
individual as "a machine ready to run," while Skinner saw 
the person as a "black box." The contemporary metaphor is 
cybernetic, as theorists talk of "information processing" or 
"decision rules" depicting such in terms of computer-in-
spired flow-charts. Not surprisingly, in view of the dimi-
nished importance of an individual in the causal scheme, and 
the salience of environmental determinants, the Lockean 
theorists generally take an extraspective point of view 
meaning that they " (frame) theoretical explanations of 
things and/or events in the third person, from the con-
venience of an observer" (Rychlak, 1988, p. 512). 
Xhe Lockean Explanations of Meaningfulness and Affect 
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The explanations of meaningfulness and affect made in 
the Lockean tradition reflect the tenets of that theoretical 
orientation. Within the Lockean theoretical framework, the 
meaningfulness of an item is defined as the item's familia-
rity (Houston, 1976, p. 223) This conceptualization of 
meaningfulness dates back to the work by Ebbinghaus who 
found that one tends to memorize a poem more easily than a 
list of nonsense syllables (Hintzman, 1978, p. 20). 
Familiarity in itself is a frequency/contiguity based-
relation; to put it simply, the more familiar the item is, 
the more likely it has been encountered in the past. Under-
wood, Ekstrand, and Keppel (1965) reflect this basic prin-
ciple by ref erring to meaningfulness in terms of frequency 
of an item in the linguistic environment. Collins and 
Loftus's (1975) network model offers a similar interpreta-
tion. The more often an item appears in the person's expe-
rience, the more likely it is to appear contiguously with 
the other items, thus forming associative links with those 
items. In turn, these associative links provide more 
avenues for access to the original item. 
Since these formulations define meaningfulness' in 
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terms of the previous experiences with items, the opera-
tionalization of meaningfulness is no longer a metric of 
importance or the significance of an item to an individual, 
but is a measure of the frequency of his/her encounters with 
an item. To illustrate the latter point, the meaningfulness 
of the eve trigrams are operationalized either as the number 
of word associations a subject can generate in the response 
to a trigram, or in terms of the subjects rating whether a 
trigram "looked like a word, sounded like a word, or could 
be used in a sentence (possibly as an acronym)" (Rychlak, 
1988, p. 368). The latter operationalization was used by 
Archer (1960) in the development of the norms for the 
meaningfulness of the trigrams (termed the association value 
(AV] of a trigram). 
One of the Lockean interpretation of the affect is 
found in behaviorism. Here, it is claimed that liked items 
are those that are associated with the positive contingen-
cies, and disliked items are those associated with the nega-
tive contingencies (Rychlak, 1988 p. 367). Thus a person 
who consistently ate tasty apples would show a preference 
for "apples", while a person who consistently ate spoiled 
apples would not. Thus, this explanation employs both the 
contiguity principle (i.e., temporal proximity of a behavior 
and a contingency) as well as the frequency principle (i.e., 
the number of times a person has to experience the relation 
between a behavior and a contingency in order to learn it). 
If the contingencies have a verbal label, then, these too 
would become associated with the item following the same 
causal principles. 
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Working in the verbal learning tradition, Zajonc 
(1968) argued that the mere exposure to learnable items 
translates into a preference for them. Thus he relied 
strictly on the frequency principle in his causal explana-
tion of affect. Zajonc's explication of affect stipulates 
its relation to the meaningfulness, since both are assumed 
to be "due" to the frequency of previous exposures. Hence, 
the value of an item in the eyes of an individual is ex-
plained by citing the environmentally determined frequency 
of the item's exposure in the individual's experience. 
In his comprehensive review of cognitive psychology, 
Mandler (1985) cites three possible explanations of affect 
(as defined here) to which he refers to as cognitive evalua-
tion, and discusses in the context of emotions (p. 
116). Interestingly, it is a rather short section and 
rather speculative, thus revealing the relative disinterest 
cognitive psychologists have shown toward this area. 
It should be noted from the outset that Mandler calls 
these three explanations "sources" of cognitive evaluation 
(ibid.), thus already framing his explanation in terms of 
the efficient cause. The first such "source" is the "in-
nate approach and withdrawal tendencies interpreted as 
value" (ibid., p. 117). Here, we actually see an interplay 
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of material and efficient causation. Mandler proceeds to 
list stimuli that elicit approach and avoidance reactions, 
such as sweetness and pain. Thus, at least initially, the 
reactions can be attributed to the physical nature of the 
stimuli. He then argues that a person's observations of 
his/her pattern of avoidance and approach reactions "produce 
the judgment of positive or negative value" (ibid., italics 
added). This second point is based exclusively on the 
frequency/contiguity principle since the end result 
(affective judgment) is due to association between the 
nature of the stimulus and the individual behavior. As was 
the case with the behavioristic position, it would be fair 
to say that if a set pattern of behavior is given a value 
label this value label would become associated with the 
stimulus object. 
The second source of cognitive evaluation according to 
Mandler has to do with "cultural, social and idiosyncratic 
predications" (ibid.). In contrast to the predicational 
model that will be discussed below, Mandler gives this term 
a mediational interpretation. He stipulates that objects 
acquire these "predications" as a result of "personal learn-
ing experience," which may or may not involve direct ex-
perience with an object. The distinction between "cultural 
and social" and "idiosyncratic" is a matter of scope. For 
instance, we may learn that "war is hell" through public 
media, or that Volkswagens are excellent cars from a 
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personal conversation with a friend. While the first 
attitude may be shared by a large segment of our culture, 
the later sentiment may be shared by few. Yet, regardless 
of the scope of the affective relation, an individual is 
still a passive recipient of that information, rather than 
being actively involved in rendering an affective judgment. 
Thus, the source of the affective value remains external to 
a person; although one may not directly experience war, one 
nevertheless directly experiences a contiguous presentation 
of the term "war" with its affective label. The difference 
between a pacifist and a warmonger can be explained by the 
difference in the previous input pertaining to the value 
label associated with "war." 
The third source of "cognitive evaluation" has to do 
with the "structural value" which (according to Mandler) 
"resides in the cognitive structure of objects, in the re-
lationship among features" (ibid.). By underscoring the 
component part of an object, Mandler already reflects the 
Lockean tradition, specifically the reductionism discussed 
above. He further notes that judgment of value depends upon 
"frequency of encounter with objects and events" (ibid.), 
thus clearly asserting the frequency/contiguity principle. 
Since, this thesis intends to explore the notion of 
"affective meaningfulness," this would be a good point at 
which to venture a formulation of the Lockean conceptualiza-
tion of this construct. Given that meaningfulness is 
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defined in terms of familiarity and affect in terms of the 
association between an item and a value label, affective 
meaningfulness would involve a strongly associated and 
frequently encountered relationship between an item and a 
value label. This is a circular relationship in that 
frequent invocation of a given associative relationship will 
in turn strengthen that relationship. The content of the 
associative relationship according to the Lockean model 
would be determined by the individual's past (or vicarious) 
experiences. The frequency with which this relationship is 
"activated," and thus the strength of that relationship 
would depend upon the particularities of the indivi-
dual's environment. 
CHAPTER III 
KANTIAN THEORY AND PREDICATION 
Kantian Perspective 
The major point of departure of the Kantian theories 
from the Lockean tradition concerns the role of an in-
dividual in relation to his/her environment. In his criti-
cism of the British empiricists, Kant argued that even 
sensations must be initially framed in terms of temporal and 
spacial dimensions. Such organization is not in the input 
itself, but is rather imposed upon the sensory input to make 
it meaningful (Rychlak, 1988, chap. 3). Thus, the organiza-
tion of the sensations logically precedes the experience 
rather than being determined by the experience. As such the 
organization is a prior, rather than post hoc. This is a 
top-down formulation of causality that employs the formal 
cause rather than the efficient cause. According to this 
perspective a person is no longer a passive recipient of 
environmental inputs. As a nativist, Kant argued that 
people impose such organization upon sensation from birth. 
In his view, the mind is not a tabula rasa, but rather is 
proforma (ibid., p. 91). 
The direct effect of the environmental factors is fur-
22 
23 
ther negated when it comes to higher mental operations such 
as thinking and comprehension (ibid., p. 89). According to 
Kant, here we find the operation of transcendental 
dialectic, or an ability to think to the opposite of a 
premise derived through the conceptualization of direct 
experience. Thus, even though we have an environmental 
input premising that two concepts are related, we can im-
agine these concepts to be unrelated, and proceed be-
haviorially according to such a negation. For instance, 
despite the previous conceptualization of blond people as 
untrustworthy, we can without further input negate this 
relation of meaning and place our trust with a blonde 
person. We may also contradict any given premise by imagin-
ing that the opposite premise is true. As such we may dream 
of our immortality, despite the fact that all evidence 
points to our eventual demise. Finally, dialectical 
transcendence may involve affirming the premise opposite in 
meaning to the premise given. For example, if the given 
premise is "Person A is kind," the opposite premise would be 
"Person A is cruel," thus the logical conclusion would 
depend upon the meaning of "cruelty." 
On a "higher" plane of philosophical abstraction, the 
possibility of dialectical transcendence in experience opens 
the door for teleological formulations of human cognition. 
Since, the organization of environmental input can be 
transcended via dialectical reasoning, a person is faced 
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with alternatives to a "given" framework of meaning even 
when the environment does not provide such an alternative. 
In other words, a person is always faced with a choice. 
His/her actions thus must be understood in terms of the 
choices made, with the understanding that things could have 
gone otherwise. This is a final-cause formulation of human 
phenomenon. An action occurs for the sake of affirmed 
premises, chosen among at least two opposite alternatives. 
The Kantian model is not inherently unscientific, as 
some psychologists assume it to be. The difference between 
the Lockean and Kantian traditions would be in terms of the 
critical variable postulated to account for a given ex-
perimental effect and not necessarily in terms of the 
application of scientific method per se. For example, from 
the Kantian perspective, the notorious failure to classi-
cally condition infants can be attributed to the infants 
inability to frame the contiguous relationships between the 
conditioned and unconditioned stimulus (Sameroff, 1971). 
The critical variables in the "awareness in conditioning" 
studies (see Rychlak, 1981, chap. 7) seem to be the sub-
jects' perception of the relation between the targeted 
behavior and the reinforcer as well as their choice either 
to comply or not to comply with the experimenter's manipu-
lation. 
Given the importance of the person's choice and his/ 
her framing of the relations in all experience, the in-
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dividual him/herself can be regarded as the "critical 
variable" in the causal scheme. The Kantian model en-
courages us to take an introspective rather than an ex-
traspective perspective --that is to "(frame) theories of 
things and/or events in the first person, from the outlook 
of an identity acting within them" (Rychlak, 1988, p. 513). 
The Predicational Model 
The theoretical position advanced in this thesis 
assigns to affect the function of organizing materials along 
an evaluative dimension of meaningfulness. Based upon the 
tenets of logical learning theory (LLT) (ibid., chaps. 7-9), 
the process by which an individual achieves this orga-
nization of meaning is termed predication, defined as: "the 
cognitive act of affirming, denying or qualifying the 
certain patterns of meaning in relation to other patterns of 
meaning" (ibid., p. 517). 
This definition further stipulates that:"Predication 
always proceeds from a broader range of (precedent) meaning 
to a (sequaciously) narrower, targeted range of meaning" 
(ibid.). 
The terms "precedent" and "sequacious" refer to the 
logical order which this process follows without considera-
tion for the time factor assumed by efficient causation. As 
this definition implies, the precedent meaning goes first in 
the logical order, and hence establishes the logical course 
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along which the predication will proceed. The term "sequa-
cious" literally means "slavishly complaint." As such, the 
result of a given predication is predetermined by the 
precedent meaning affirmed, qualified or negated at the 
"protopoint"-- the time when such affirmation, qualification 
or negations are made (ibid.). Thus, reflecting the Kantian 
position that stipulates the importance of the organization 
of input by an active intelligence, the predicational model 
postulates that this process occurs at the initiation of 
cognition. In view of the dialectical reasoning endorsed by 
the Kantian models, the predicational process involves 
denying as well as affirming the precedent meaning. 
Rychlak employs Euler circles to illustrate the 
logical relation implied by the predicational process (see 
Figure 1 below). No claim is made here that the brain is 
drawing these circles, of course. But as a model within 
which to understand how people reason, the Euler circles 
used widely in logic, philosophy and mathematics -- prove 
helpful. Thus, for example, when we say that "All human 
beings are mortal" we, in effect, frame the meaning of 
"human beings" by the broader expanse of meaning that may be 
labeled "mortality," or "mortal organisms," and so forth. 
The meaning of the latter is extended to the former. The 
"target" (human being) is the end, point, or "telos" to 
which meaning is being extended. 
The affirmation of "mortality" in relation to "human 
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beings" also implies that human beings are not "immortal," 
thUS the affirmation of "mortality" involves the negation of 
"immortality" in relation to "human beings." The meaning of 
"human beings" thus also involves the understanding of what 
"human beings" are not, and knowing what "human beings" are 
not implies knowing what they are. In this sense, as 
illustrated by Figure 1, the outside of the circle delimits 
the meaning of what is inside the circle and vice versa. 
Thus, oppositionality is always an ingredient in any 
predication. It should be noted that the previous 
discussion referred to meaning rather than meaningfulness. 
Yet, according to the definition of meaning cited in the 
first chapter of this thesis, meaningfulness is the 
component of this definition signifying the relation between 
a concept'~ meaning and the individual using that concept 
(i.e., word, etc.). In view of the discussion of the 
importance of an individual in the causal schemes postulated 
by the Kantian model, the word "component" is misleading 
since it connotes some type of subservience of 
meaningfulness to meaning. Given the significance of an 
individual in such schemes, it is more theoretically 
appropriate to elevate meaningfulness to a commanding role 
"over" meaning. Thus, the affective assessment as the 
metric of affective meaningfulness (measured via a 
liked/disliked dimension) should be regarded as the most 
broad and fundamental precedent which a person extends to 
predicate the meaningfulness of anything in his/her ex-
perience. 
This brings us to the definition of affective pre-
dication, as follows: 
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Affective predication is the cognitive act of affirm-
ing the meaningfulness of any item in experience by framing 
it within the broad dimension of likability. The person's 
affective preference of "liked" or "disliked" is extended to 
whatever is being focused upon in cognition, just as any 
predicate meaning frames and is then extended to some 
targeted item of interest. Inputs from experience do not 
determine affective predication. The latter always frame 
the former at the point of "input." 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE IN SUPPORT OF AFFECTIVE PREDICATION 
The previous chapter introduced the predicational 
model of cognition as an antithesis to Lockean models, and 
placed the explanation of affective assessment within the 
framework of this predicational model. The assessment of 
the stimuli in terms of a like/dislike dimension is thus 
seen as setting forth the major premises in any line of 
thought, recollection, and so on. In the framework of 
scientific method, this precedent context can be construed 
as the independent variable. Therefore, the hypothesis 
subjected to an empirical validation can be stated as 
follows: "If item A is assessed as liked, then B would 
follow." Given the oppositionality implied by the predica-
tion model the related hypothesis is "If item A is assessed 
as disliked then non-B would follow." According to the 
logical relations postulated by the predicational model, "B" 
and "non B" represent the "telos" or target to which the 
major premise is extended. In the empirical validation of 
these hypotheses, they represents the dependent variable. 
The present chapter is dedicated to the empirical evi-
dence gathered in support of the theoretical claims made by 
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the predicational model of affect. 
Influence of Affective Assessment on Learning 
The early studies on affective assessment have shown 
that persons learn consonant-vowel-consonant (eve) trigrams 
which they have rated as positive more readily than those 
which they have rated as negative regardless of the as-
sociative value (Archer 1960) of these trigrams. This was 
termed the "RV positive effect" and it was demonstrated in a 
number of different tasks such as free recall (Rychlak, 
1966), recognition (Labertaux, 1968), or when the rate of 
learning was measured in terms of trials to criterion 
(Abramson, 1967). 
Subsequent studies have also found RV-positive effects 
when learning materials were other than eve trigrams. For 
instance, Apao (1979) noted that positive affective assess-
ment facilitates the primacy effect when learning words and 
Rychlak, Galster and McFarland (1972) and Rychlak and Saluri 
(1973) have shown the RV positive effect in learning names. 
Slife and Rychlak (1981) discovered that students tend to 
get better grades on academic subtopics in a course that 
they have prerated as liked. The RV effect was found 
regardless of induced states such as those of psychotropic 
drugs among psychiatric subjects (Rychlak, McKee, Schneider 
& Abramson, 1971) and alcohol intoxication (Mosbacher, 
1984). 
32 
on the other hand, psychiatric subjects (Rychlak, 
McKee, Schneider & Abramson, 1971) as well as high school 
students and fifth graders with low self esteem (Rychlak, 
Carlsen & Dunning 1974; August,Rychlak & Felker, 1975) 
learned negatively rated materials more readily than posi-
tively rated ones. A similar effect was shown by Rychlak, 
Carlsen and Dunning (1974) who found that subjects learned 
liked words from a realm they assessed as liked (e.g. 
relations with authority) mo~e readily than the words they 
disliked in this realm. Conversely, they learned disliked 
words more readily than liked words in a realm that they had 
predicated negatively (i.e., rated as disliked). Rychlak 
and Marceil (1986) demonstrated that subjects' positive or 
negative assessment of a paired associates task -- performed 
by models before the subjects participated in the identical 
task -- determined whether the subjects would learn along a 
positive or negative course of affective assessment. 
The Relation Between Measures of 
Affective and Associated Meaningfulness 
Above results, and especially the reversal of the RV 
positive effects lend themselves to interpretation of 
affective meaningfulness as a predicational process in so 
far as they follow the predicted course of meaningfulness 
extension postulated by the model. For instance, in the 
case of an RV negative effect, the learning of negative 
33 
items over positive (we may call this a negative learning 
style) is sequacious to a broader pattern of meaningfulness 
representing negative assessment of self or the learning 
situation. The actual items learned depend on the assess-
ment of those items and the learning style. We can see the 
gradient of "broadness" in this interpretation of results: 
from the most encompassing affective predication of self or 
the learning task, to the affective predication of items, 
reflected in the measure of learning. 
Although this is a plausible explanation, it does not 
in itself falsify the alternative mechanistic explanations 
of affective assessment cited in the previous chapter. 
Based upon the Lockean model, we can suggest that the rating 
itself is due to frequency of exposure to the stimuli, or in 
the behaviorist's interpretation, due to the type of 
contingencies involved in these previous exposures. Abram-
son, Tasto and Rychlak (1969) found no interaction between 
RV and associative value (AV) of eve trigrams, but showed 
strong main effects for each of these variables. This 
pattern of results was obtained both when AV was measured 
nomothetically and idiographically. First of all, what this 
suggests is that RV and AV theoretically measure distinct 
constructs. Second, if we are to accept an argument that RV 
ratings reflect the quality of previous experiences, we 
would expect to find an interaction between the two measures 
at the higher levels of association value. This would be 
the case, because, the more word-like trigrams would more 
likely elicit an association to a concept with which a 
subject has had some experience. 
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Kubat (1969) has shown that there is no consistent re-
lationship between the RV of a given trigram and the number 
of word associations generated by that trigram in a produc-
tion method. This study further suggests that the two mea-
sures are not related. It also contradicts the "affect as 
frequency of exposure" thesis advanced by Zajonc (1968, see 
above). If that were true, contrary to the obtained 
results, we would expect a richer associative structure 
around the positively rated items than around the negatively 
rated items. 
Tenbrunsel, Nishball and Rychlak (1968) studied 
specifically the relationship between RV and AV measures. 
Given the hypothesis that associative meaningfulness ac-
counts for affective meaningfulness, we would expect a 
confound between these measures in which the higher AV items 
would be rated more positively than lower AV items. The 
study did obtain a degree of confound between these 
measures, but it was most predominant among the lower AV 
items. In other words, the pattern of results suggested by 
the above hypothesis was limited to the variations in AV 
among the items from the lower ranges of Archer's (1960) 
norms, but was absent for items from higher ranges of 
Archer's norms. The support for the contention that AV and 
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RV are independent comes from the fact that if these mea-
sures were the variations of the same thing, we would find a 
pattern of results signifying a strong relationship between 
high AV items and "liked" rating and low AV and "disliked" 
rating, rather than variations within the lower range of 
associative norms. 
Rychlak, Flynn and Burger (1979) advanced the notion 
of orthogonality between RV and AV measures based on the 
findings of cross-validating factor analysis. In this 
study, subjects were asked to rate eve trigrams on a number 
of different dimensions. Besides looking at the ratings 
that correspond to RV measures (i.e., like/dislike) and 
those that correspond to AV measures (i.e., word-like/not 
word-like) the factor analysis also looked at the judgment 
of the items' perceived "learnability" (i.e., easy/hard to 
learn, easy/difficult to pronounce). This was done to 
address the criticism that the RV measure may reflect 
subjects' estimations of how easy it is to learn a given 
item. The results revealed a clear RV factor and a clear AV 
factor as well as a third factor termed "familiarity within 
the experiment." The "ease of learning" judgment tended to 
load closer to the AV factor than to the RV factor. As an 
interesting footnote, ratings in terms of Osgood's (1952) 
evaluative dimension (i.e., good/bad) loaded on the RV 
factor. As noted in the Introduction, the fourth code 
mentioned by Fiske and Taylor (1984) referred to this 
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evaluative dimension of the semantic differential. This 
finding allows us to draw a parallel between the evaluative 
dimension and the RV rating used in affective assessment 
studies. 
In view of the demonstrated orthogonality of RV and AV 
it does not seem plausible to think of the latter deter-
mining the former. That is, we cannot really suggest that 
affection is "due to" frequent and contiguous contact with 
this or that item in experience. It is just as plausible to 
suggest that affective assessment is at the basis of fre-
quent contact in life experience. We are drawn to and 
engage what we like. If we predicate something as harmful, 
we are sure to find unlikable aspects of this object or 
experience cropping up. 
Effects of Affective Predication on 
Cognitive Organization 
The studies discussed up to this point, demonstrated 
the effects of the postulated process in terms of the rate 
of learning. Namely, there was a consistent relationship 
between the postulated pattern of meaningfulness and the 
type of items recalled. In view of these studies, affective 
predication can also be understood as an organizing process 
and hence a process comparable to a schematic organization. 
Like a schema, affective predication imposes an organization 
which is reflected in the pattern of storage in memory as 
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well as in terms of its influences on subsequent cognitive 
acts. In view of this point, we can depict the process of 
affective predication as imposing a categorical structure 
consisting of a very broad designation of "liked meanings" 
and "disliked meanings" upon stimuli. Thus, we would expect 
to find similar effects to those obtained for categories 
elsewhere in the literature. For example, Bugaj (1984) 
found a clustering of liked traits used by subjects to 
characterize an individual. His results parallel those at-
tained by Hoffman, Mischel and Mazze (1981) and Jefferey and 
Mischel (1979) who concluded that traits are organized by 
categories. Of course, in Bugaj's study the organizing cate-
gory was one of affective assessment. Here, affective pre-
dication functions to organize traits that have a similar 
affective relationship according to the subjects' point of 
view. 
Nguyen (1975) has actually established that affective 
predication determines the content of associatively based 
categories. In this experiment, she found that subjects 
cluster words according to their RV rating within categories 
such as "animals" or "professions." Furthermore, affective 
predication influenced the recall of words within each ca-
tegory as subjects were more likely to recall the liked than 
the disliked words in a given category. 
Nguyen's findings are consistent with the general pro-
position that the structure of semantic memory is catego-
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rical and that the invocation of a category within which an 
item is stored facilitates recall. Thus, Nguyen's study 
expands our understanding of memory structure by introducing 
a new level of conceptual organization. Her results 
encourage us to look for the "fourth code" not at a 
subservient or parallel level to the established categorical 
levels, but at a superceding or initiating level. As such, 
her results furnish further evidence that affective assess-
ment is a broad conceptual category involved in the process 
of affectively predicating items in terms of their 
meaningfulness to an individual. The effects on learning 
obtained in her study as well as the studies that have been 
cited are the result of this process --a sequacious meaning-
extension necessitated by the initial predication of the 
items' meaningfulness. 
Affective Predication as a Dialectical Process 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the predica-
tional model takes into consideration the dialectical nature 
of human cognition. In regard to affective meaningfulness, 
the cognitive organization imposed upon items as the result 
of the predicational process is bi-polar, meaning that the 
postulated categories of "liked" and "disliked" items are 
related in such a way that one pole of the meaningfulness 
dimension delimits the other. This bipolarity of the 
cognitive organization was demonstrated by Rychlak, Williams 
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and Bugaj (1986) and Bugaj and Rychlak (1989). 
In the Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj (1986) study, 
subjects exhibited the RV positive effect when learning the 
social descriptors that they had previously assessed as 
"liked" as well as when learning the antonyms of the social 
discriptors they previously had rated as "disliked". In the 
Bugaj and Rychlak (1989) experiment, subjects rated antonyms 
of liked primes negatively and antonyms of disliked primes 
positively. The ratings of synonyms were identical to the 
rating of the primes. 
Primacy of Affective Predication 
As stated previously, the theoretical approach taken 
by Rychlak and his associates is to suggest that predication 
is a process occurring "from birth." This means that a 
predication initiates (causes) learning rather than derives 
from it as an "effect." The postulated bipolar categories 
of "liked" and 'disliked" are believed to be innate and the 
process of imposing these categories upon experience occurs 
at the protopoint of cognition. There are three types of 
evidence that can be used to support these basic assump-
tions. 
First, if the line of theorizing proposed here is cor-
rect, it should be possible to demonstrate that subjects 
will rely more on affective assessment (or RV) when their 
learnable materials ~ the intellectualized or verbal dis-
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criminants of association value (AV) than when such dis-
criminants obtain. 1 That is, when a learner confronts ma-
terials to which he or she has "no" or "few" associations, 
when there is a lack of verbalized knowledge concerning the 
task at hand, affective assessment should be relied upon. 
Why? Because this capacity to predicate experience in terms 
of an oppositional "liked-disliked" is unlearned. Affective 
preferences are based on experience. But experience does 
not provide the choice as "liked" versus "disliked." This 
rendering of a preference is made by the evaluating 
intellect of the person as he or she confronts the "past 
experiences" initially -- literally from birth onward. 
Hence, it should be possible to design experiments proving 
that as specified cognitive associations are weakened, 
reliance on affective predication increases. 
August and Rychlak (1978) have actually demonstrated 
something of this sort in the learning of abstract versus 
concrete words among 5th grade pupils. In this study, 
abstract words are analogous to the lower AV of eve tri-
grams. That is, a highly abstract stimulus like "truth" 
lacks the concrete associative relations (such as visual 
referents) which subjects may employ as a learning heuristic 
(Paivio, 1965). As predicted, RV was found to have a 
greater effect when learning abstract (e.g., "truth") than 
1 Note: In earlier research on 
dimension of "like-dislike" was 
"reinforcement value" or "RV." 
affective assessment, this 
operationally defined as 
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concrete words (e.g., "tree"). 
Additional support for this hypothesis comes from 
several studies which argue that affective predication is a 
native human capacity, and thus a process which begins at 
girth. It was postulated that only later in life, due to 
subsequent learning, does an individual begin to rely on 
past associative relations. Therefore, these studies con-
tended, there should be greater reliance on affective predi-
cation than on associative relations as a heuristic in 
learning among subjects who have less overall schooling. 
Consistent with this premise, it was discovered that affec-
tive predication plays an even greater role than usual in 
learning among younger children (Rychlak, 1975a), persons of 
a lower than middle socio-economic class (Rychlak, 1975b) 
and the educationally disabled (Woodward, 1978). 
The above hypothesis also implies that predication 
occurs at the commencement of a cognitive process. This is 
a reflection of the basic tenets of the Kantian model which 
postulates the top-down approach to cognition beginning with 
the imposition of meaning upon stimuli. 
Highly convincing evidence for the postulate that 
affective predication occurs at the beginning of a cognitive 
process is found in the studies that directly contrast 
affective predication with other types of cognitive or-
ganization. Interesting results were obtained by Rychlak's 
(1974) study that asked subjects to reverse the learning-
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rate order of RV or AV effects. Subjects were able to 
reverse their AV effect (meaning they were able to learn the 
trigrams rated low in associative value first) but not the 
RV-positive effect. Normal subjects could not learn 
disliked materials quicker than liked materials, even though 
they tried to do so. Presumably, abnormal subjects would be 
unable to learn liked faster than disliked items, though 
this was not tested. This study lends further support to the 
suggestion that the stimulus materials were affectively 
predicated at the initiation of the learning process. The 
affective predication set the meaningful context which 
subjects could not negate without reassessing their initial 
position in regard to the stimulus materials. On the other 
hand, their ability to reverse the AV effect suggests that 
reliance on an associatively derived heuristic does not 
create a similarly broad context which dictates the subse-
quent course of cognitive processing. Rather, AV seems re-
lates to an ongoing process in which each stimulus is 
treated differently. 
The Present Experiment 
The present study employs a nomothetic approach to 
affective predication in contrast to the idiographic one em-
ployed in the majority of the previously cited research on 
affective assessment. Tenbrunsel, Nishball and Rychlak 
(1968) have shown that a nomothetic measurement of affective 
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essment has only a moderate (.54) test-retest reliability ass 
which was significant at ~=.01, but this study was done 
using eve trigrams. The writer believes that the stimulus 
materials used in the present study -- i.e., sentences --
lend themselves particularly well to the nomothetic ap-
proach. 
Unlike eve trigrams, sentences are intended to convey 
certain meanings between individuals who for the sake of 
understanding each other have entered a "social contract" 
(Rommetveit,1974, cited by O'Connell, 1988). After all, 
communication as well as language (O'Connell, 1988) is a 
social phenomenon and therefore a certain degree of inter-
subjecti vi ty must obtain. In view of our discussion to this 
point, we can speculate that the meaning expressed by a 
sentence will have the positive/negative predication which 
we theorize is the most fundamental dimension of 
meaningfulness, and is one which must be shared by the 
individuals engaged in communication with each other. The 
assumption is that the overall positive or negative meaning-
fulness of the sentence constitutes the broad ground that 
will have an effect on the precedent-seguacious course of 
cognitive processing. 
Given that we have found previous research suggesting 
that a person's affective preference (liked/disliked) enters 
into his or her learning and memory processes quite early 
(at the protopoint), it should be possible to demonstrate 
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some thing of the sort in a sentence-learning task. That 
is, previous studies relied on strings of eve trigrams or 
words, either in paired associates or serial position. The 
experimenter could not discern in this process precisely 
"where" in the learning process that affective predication 
came into play. The writer believes that through the use of 
a sentence procedure it should be possible to demonstrate 
that affective assessment will come into play even more so 
than a comparison factor such as association value. 
For example, let us assume that we were to ask sub-
jects to learn to complete a series of sentences, such as: 
When competing with others, John is 
In solving problems, John is 
When life gets strained, John is 
According to the present theoretical analysis, the 
initial phrase (i.e. In competing with others) in these 
sentences sets the context for the predication of John to 
follow (sequacious meaning extension). If, an ending of the 
sort "In competing with others, John is fearless" is 
considered "positive" and an ending of the sort "In solving 
problems, John is slow" proves "negative" in meaningfulness, 
then we have the basis for making a prediction. That is, 
based on previous research findings, we predict that the 
word "fearless" would be learned more readily in completing 
these sentences that the word "slow." 
But even more importantly, we should find that when a 
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subject cannot recall the specific words "fearless" and/or 
"slow" he or she should be able to give us the affective 
quality of the sentence completion. Furthermore, a subject 
who cannot recall "fearless" should be able to guess that 
the word not yet learned has a positive meaning more readily 
than he or she will recall the negativity of the sentence 
completion requiring "slow." In other words, we should see 
the same "positive RV effect" in the presaged meaning-
extension that we saw in the recall of eve trigrams and 
words in earlier research. If people really do rely upon 
affective assessment as a very basic --literally pre-verbal-
-form of predication we should expect to find such dif-
ferences in their anticipated learning efforts. 
As a comparison to the affective predication procedure 
we might ask a different group of subjects to guess at the 
actual word meaning through use of a similar or synonymous 
word. For example, a subject who could not recall the word 
"fearless" might recall another word such as "courageous." 
Would this capacity to think of words similar to the one 
being learned compare favorably to the capacity to guess the 
affective quality of the sentence even before a word is at-
tempted? It should be possible to assess the relative suc-
cess rate of affective guesses (akin to RV) and similar word 
guesses (akin to AV). Based on previous research and the 
theory under development we would expect the affective gues-
ses to be more prevalent and more accurate than the similar 
word guesses. 46 
CHAPTER V 
METHOD 
Hypotheses 
(1) Subjects in a sentence completion task will an-
ticipate the affective quality of words completing a posi-
tive sentence more readily than words completing a negative 
sentence. 
Rationale. The vast preponderance of research on 
affective assessment establishes that subjects who are not 
specifically selected for a proclivity to predicate their 
experience negatively will predicate the learning task posi-
tively. Thus, random groups of college students invariably 
reflect a positive affective learning style. We therefore 
expect our subjects to behave in a comparable fashion. 
Hence, we predict that they will anticipate correctly more 
positive than negative sentence qualities even though they 
cannot recall the specific word completing this sentence. 
(2) Subjects in a sentence completion task will be 
more likely to think of synonyms to words completing a 
positive sentence than words completing a negative sentence. 
Rationale. The same theoretical reasoning applied to 
hypothesis 1 holds here. Previous research demonstrates 
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that subjects learn lists of words more readily if these 
words are liked than if they are disliked. Although we 
think affective assessment is the basic factor determining 
such learning dynamics, we expect to find affective pre-
ference reflected in actual word guesses. subjects will 
guess more correctly along a positive than a negative 
dimension of meaning. 
(3) Subjects will reflect a higher percentage of 
correct guesses when they are trying to name the affective 
quality of the missing word completions than when they are 
guessing similar words to these completions. 
Rationale. Since it is our view that affective as-
sessment is among the most fundamental or basic predications 
made in human learning, it follows that the scores issuing 
from affective guessing should be more plentiful and 
accurate than scores issuing from the word guesses. 
Obviously, the task confronting the subject who has to guess 
similar words involves both affective predication and 
additional factors in the learning process. We believe 
these additional factors do involve predication as well; but 
since there is an obvious complexity added to the task, a 
subject may be expected to do more poorly in guessing words 
than in guessing affective quality alone. 
(4) Subjects in the sentence completion task will be 
able to recall words completing the positive sentences more 
readily than the words completing the negative sentences. 
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Bationale. This hypothesis pertains to a manipulation 
check on the positive affective assessment's facilitation of 
learning discussed in rationale for hypothesis 1 and hypo-
thesis 2. We expect that subjects will reach the learning 
criterion of two errorless trials of an entire list of sen-
tences by providing correct sentence completions for 
positive sentences in fewer trials than for negative senten-
ces. Results in the predicted direction will lend 
additional support for our hypothesis that affective predi-
cation is employed by the subjects in this learning task. 
Subjects. 
Seventy undergraduates fulfilling requirements for 
the introductory psychology course at Loyola University of 
Chicago were assigned to the between group conditions using 
the randomized blocks procedure (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 
1985). Twenty other subjects were used to pretest the 
experimental material. Out of these, 6 served to pre-rate 
sentences and another 3 pre-rated the stems of the senten-
ces. Another group of 5 individuals was recruited to rate 
the subjects' responses. These individuals were blind to 
the experimental hypotheses and the identity of the sub-
jects. 
Experimental Tasks 
Following the presentation of complete sentences 
during an initial learning trial (see below), the principle 
task employed in this study required subjects to provide an 
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omitted predicate (e.g., "graceful") of a sentence cued by 
the stem of that sentence (e.g., "In athletics, John 
If a subject failed to do so within 5 seconds or had 
' II 1S •••• 
provided an incorrect predicate, he/she was prompted to 
perform one of the two following tasks depending upon the 
between-subjects condition he/she was assigned to: (a) guess 
the affective valence of the omitted predicate by stating 
whether it was "positive" or "negative," within 15 seconds 
of the prompt; (b) suggest a similar word to the omitted 
predicate within 15 seconds of the prompt. These test 
trials continued until a subject reached a learning 
criterion of two errorless trials. 
Apparatus 
All testing was done using an IBM PC personal computer 
with a gray monochrome monitor and the original (i.e., 10 
function keys layout) IBM PC keyboard. 
A program was written specifically for the purposes 
of this experiment. During a learning trial the program 
presented sentences in the following fashion: The stem 
(e.g., "In athletics, John is ••. ") was presented first on 
the upper left hand side of the screen for 2 seconds, and 
the predicate (e.g., "graceful") was presented next on the 
upper right hand side of the screen for another 2 seconds. 
Thus, the stem was on the screen for a total of 4 seconds, 
with the last 2 seconds appearing together with the word 
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completing the sentence. The order of sentence presentation 
was randomized and there was no delay between items on the 
list. 
Between the learning trial and the first test trial, a 
message "Now try to complete these sentences" appeared for 5 
seconds. During the test trials, the stems of the sentences 
were presented as before. A timer appeared right above 
where the predicates were located during the learning trial. 
The timer was set to 5 seconds, and counted down to zero, 
reflecting the time given to subjects to start their res-
ponse. A message "Please press enter to continue" was 
placed right below where the predicates appeared during the 
learning trial. The order of stem presentation was ran-
domized for each test trial. 
The timer stoped as soon as a subject began to enter 
his/her response. The program waited until a subject 
pressed the "enter" key to proceed further. Once, a subject 
pressed the "enter" key the program compared the response to 
the correct answer. No discrepancy between the response and 
the correct answer was tolerated by the program, thus 
subjects were instructed to check their spelling and 
allowance was made for misspelling when reviewing subjects' 
protocols (see below). 
If the response matched the correct predicate, the 
program flashed a "Good Job!" message in the center of the 
screen for 2 seconds and moved to the next item on the list. 
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Thus, there was a 1-second delay between items on the test 
trials. If the list was exhausted, the program presented a 
message "This is an end of a trial ••• ," toward the bottom 
center of the screen. The duration of this message was 2 
seconds, thus signifying the between-test trial delay. The 
program self terminated after two consecutive errorless test 
trials (see below for the discussion of the trial to cri-
terion scores). 
If a subject's response did not match the correct 
predicate, or if the time expired before a subject made an 
entry, the course of the program depended on the experimen-
tal condition the subject was assigned to. 
If a subject was assigned to the condition that re-
quired him/her to state the affective valence of the predi-
cate, a prompt "Is this word Positive or Negative; enter P 
or N" appeared in the left-center of the screen. A prompt 
"Press enter to continue" then appeared below the previous 
prompt. The timer was set to 10 seconds. Once, a subject 
pressed "enter" or if the time ran out, the program moved to 
the next item. 
If a subject was assigned to the condition that re-
quired him/her to provide a similar word, a prompt "Similar 
word:" appeared in the left-center of the screen, and a 
prompt "Press enter to continue" right below it. The timer 
was reset to 10 seconds. Once, a subject entered his/her 
response, or if the time expired, the program moved to the 
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next item. 
Independent Variables 
The between subjects independent variables in this 
study were the experimental conditions defined by the task 
performed by subjects when they failed to provide a correct 
predicate on a test trial. As stated above, one group of 
subjects was asked to state the affective valence of an 
omitted predicate. This group is ref erred to as the 
Affective Judgment condition. The second group was in-
structed to provide a similar word to the omitted predicate. 
This group is referred to as the Similarity Judgment 
condition. The instructions given to these groups are cited 
below in the procedure section. These group variables were 
used in all analyses of variance preformed to test the above 
hypotheses. 
For the test of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 the types of 
sentences were differentiated in terms of the stem-predicate 
combinations. Thus, we have two within subjects variables: 
affective valence of the stem (positive or negative) and the 
affective valence of the word completion (also positive or 
negative). The interception of these variables defined the 
type of sentences presented to the subjects. For instance, 
the stem "In athletics, John is .•• " was rated as positive 
(see below in the "Material" section for the rating proce-
dure), while the stem "On a rainy day, John is ••• " was rated 
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as negative. Thus, a positive stem (e.g., "In athletics, 
John is ... ") combined with a positive predicate (such as 
"graceful") resulted in a positive stem-positive predicate 
(PP) sentence (i.e., "In athletics, John is graceful"), 
which had an overall positive rating. By combining a 
negative stem (e.g., "On a rainy day, John is ... ") with a 
negative predicate (e.g., "sad") the negative stem, negative 
predicate sentences (NN) were derived, which had an overall 
negative valence. Other possible stem-predicate 
combinations were also used. Thus, there were positive 
stem, negative predicate or "PN" sentences (e.g., "In 
athletics, John is clumsy.") that had an overall negative 
valence, and the negative stem, positive predicate or "NP" 
sentences (e.g., "On a rainy day, John is happy.") that had 
overall positive valence. 
The reason for this more precise differentiation of 
the sentence types than was mentioned in hypotheses 1, 2, 
and 3 was because we wanted to test for a possibility that 
the stem-predicate combinations by themselves could have 
influenced the subjects' responses. This situation posed 
the most serious threat in the Affective Judgment condition, 
in which subjects were instructed to provide the affective 
valence of the omitted predicates. It was theoretically 
possible that subjects could have relied on the valence of 
the stem to guess the affective valence of the predicate. 
Thus the test of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 involved comparisons 
55 
between types of stem (positive or negative), types of word 
completion for these stems (positive and negative) and also 
the between subjects variable (Affective Judgment and 
Similarity Judgment conditions). To test the hypothesis 
4 1 only the overall affective valence of the sentences was 
used to operationalize the within-subjects variable. As 
such, the test of hypothesis 4 is a comparison between the 
sets of positive and negative sentences and the group 
variables. 
Dependent variables 
Trials to criterion scores: The first dependent variable 
under consideration was the trials to criterion score, 
defined as the number of test trials that it took a subject 
to reach two errorless trials for the list. The two error-
less trials were included in the score. For example, if a 
subject did not make an error for any of the positive 
sentences after the third trial, his/her trials to criterion 
score for the positive sentences would have been "5." If 
the same subject made the last error on any of the negative 
sentences on the fourth trial, his/her trial to criterion 
score for the negative sentences would have been 11 6." The 
analysis of this variable constituted a test of hypothesis 
4. 
To clarify this scoring, let us consider an experi-
mental protocol of an imaginary subject named Sampson. 
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Assume, Sampson had completed the task in seven trials. 
That is, he made errors on the first five trials, but by the 
sixth trial, he correctly anticipated all the words in all 
the sentences and this carried over to the seventh trial as 
well. Also, assume that on the fifth trial, Sampson made an 
error only for a negative sentence, while the last error for 
a positive sentence occurred on the fourth trial. Thus, his 
trials to criterion score for negative sentences was 
"seven," but for postive sentences "six." 
As was noted above, the computer program did not 
tolerate any descrepancy between the responses and correct 
answers. Cases where the review of subject's protocol 
indicated that an initial incorrect response was due to mis-
spelling, were not counted as an error. These were rare 
(seven in all for the total sample) and none of the trials 
to criterion scores in the sample had to be adjusted because 
of misspelled responses. 
Match/error ratio scores: The second dependent variable was 
the "match/error ratio" score that was used to test hypo-
theses 1, 2 and 3. This represented the number of matches 
over the number of errors affording the opportunities to 
make a match for a particular type of sentence. For 
example, if our imaginary subject Sampson failed to 
provide a correct word completion to the PP sentences on the 
list (e.g., "In athletics, John is graceful.") five times 
while reaching the learning criterion, he/she was prompted 
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five times to either state the affective valence of these 
sentences, or to enter a similar word. The operationa-
lization of the "match" varied according to the between-
subject condition and is discussed below. Since the number 
of opportunities was expected to vary due to individual dif-
ferences in learning the experimental material, and due to 
the variations in learning expected under hypothesis 4, the 
number of "matches" was divided by the number of oppor-
tunities to make a match, yielding a ratio score. This 
score was computed for each type of the sentence (PP, NP, 
NN, PN) and was used to test hypotheses 1,2 and 3. 
Scoring for the Affective Judgment condition was as 
follows: Any time a subject could not recall a word com-
pleting a sentence, but, when prompted to do so, was able to 
correctly state the affective quality of that word 
completion, the response was considered to be a match. 
Suppose Sampson had attempted to answer the stems "In 
athletics, John . " 1S ••• I "When solving problems, John 
is •.. ," "When competing with others, John is •.. ," all of 
which are positive stems. (see Table 1 below) Furthermore, 
suppose that each of these stems was completed by a positive 
predicate (e.g "graceful," "fast," and "active" respective-
ly), thus deriving positive stem-positive predicate (PP) 
sentences. If it took Sampson five trials to reach the 
learning criterion of two consecutive trials, these PP 
sentences were presented to him/her 15 times. 
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Assume that in these 15 times the sentences were 
presented, Sampson failed to provide a correct word comple-
tion on five occasions. For instance, he failed to answer 
all three stems on the first trial; the stem "In athletics, 
John is .•. "on the second trial; and the stem "When compet-
ing with others, John is ... " on the third trial. Each time, 
Sampson failed to provide a correct word completion, the 
computer program prompted him to state the affective valence 
of the word completion, whether it was positive or negative. 
Thus, in this example, Sampson was prompted to state the 
affective valence of the sentences five times. If he ans-
wered correctly three out of five times by entering P for 
"positive," his match/error ratio score for PP sentences 
would be 3/5 or .60. 
If the subject did not make an error for a particular 
type of sentence (for instance, the same subject answered 
all negative stems that were completed by a positive word, 
i.e., NP sentences), a score of 1.00 was assigned. 
As was noted above, misspelled responses were not 
counted as an error and thus, were droped from consideration 
in calculating the match-ratio scores. Considering 
the infrequency of their occurrence, their possible effect, 
if any, on the match-ratio scores was negligible. 
Table 1 
Positive and Negative Sentence Sterns 
Positive sterns 
1 When competing with others 
2 When eating 
3 When watching a movie 
4 When it comes to money 
5 When attending a party 
6 If schedule must be kept 
7 In solving problems 
Negative sterns 
When life gets tense 
When bad things are likely 
If fault is assigned 
When others are rude 
In dangerous situations 
When others are in trouble 
On a rainy day 
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In scoring for the Similarity Judgment condition, a 
match was defined in terms of the agreement between four out 
of five raters who judged the semantic relatedness of the 
subjects' responses; that is the particular stem they used 
with the predicate. For example, when asked to provide a 
similar word to the predicate "passive" completing the stem 
"When competing with others, John is ••. " the subjects 
responded with "slow," "vicious," "not motivated" and so on. 
The raters were given the complete sentence (e.g., "When 
competing with others, John is passive.") and the list of 
all responses to that particular stem given by the subject 
in question. The raters were instructed to state if a given 
response could be used in that sentence without altering the 
meaning of the sentence (see Appendix A for the actual 
instructions given to these raters). For example, can the 
words "not motivated" be substituted for "passive" without 
changing the meaning of the sentence "When competing with 
others, John is passive." conveys? If four out of five 
raters agreed that "not motivated" could be used in lieu of 
"passive" in that sentence, this response ("not motivated") 
was scored as a match for the subject or subjects who made 
it. 
As in the Affective Judgment condition, the derived 
score for the Similarity Judgment condition was the number 
of matches over number of opportunities to make a match. If 
a subject did not make an error for a particular type of 
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sentence, a score of 1.00 was assigned. Instances where a 
subject failed to respond to the prompt to provide a similar 
word were scored as "no match." If a subject provided a 
correct sentence completion in place of a similar word 
despite explicit instructions to the contrary, this comple-
tion was considered an error. As before, subjects were not 
penalized for misspelling words. 
Material 
This study used two lists of 14 sentences (see Appen-
dix B). The first list contained four sentences with posi-
tive stems and positive word completions (PP), three sen-
tences with positive stems and negative word completions 
(PN), three sentences with negative stems and positive word 
completions (NP), and four sentences with negative stem and 
negative word completions (NN). The second list contained 
three PP sentences, four PN sentences, four NP sentences and 
three NN sentences. Thus both lists had seven positive 
sentences and seven negative sentences. There were two 
forms of lists arranged (A and B) and subjects were randomly 
assigned to work with either list A or B. 
The two lists were assembled using the following 
procedure: Initially, two preliminary lists were made with 
each sentence consisting of a stem (e.g., "When competing 
with others John is •.• ") and a word completion (e.g., 
"active"). If a positive word completion was used in the 
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list A (i.e., "active") its antonym was used in the list B 
(e.g., "passive"). Thus, lists A and B mirrored each other 
in terms of the affective connotations of the word comple-
tions. 
Each list was given to a different group of three 
raters for their judgment. The raters were instructed to 
judge the meaningfulness of the sentences as positive or 
negative. (see Appendix C for the instructions given to 
these raters). They made their responses by circling the 
letter "P" if they thought a sentence was positive, or the 
letter "N" if they thought that the sentence was negative. 
These letters were at the end of each sentence and their 
order was randomized to control for response bias. 
In addition, the raters were asked to generate as many 
synonyms as they could for the adjectives of the sentences 
within one minute. The adjectives were underlined so that 
they would be easily recognized by the raters. 
A sentence and its variant were included on the ex-
perimental lists only if both met the following criteria: 
1) All three raters agreed on the positive or negative 
meaningfulness of a sentence. 
2) All three raters generated at least three words 
that were similar in meaning to the predicate of the 
sentence. 
The latter criterion is a precaution against using words 
that have few readily accessible associates, hence biasing 
63 
the results in favor of the Affective Judgment condition. 
originally, the design called for eight sentences to 
be used in this manner, but pre-testing showed that subjects 
were able to learn this list in two trials. This situation 
forced us to expand the lists and decrease the time of their 
presentation on the learning trial. As such, all 14 
sentences that met the above criteria were used. 
Once the sentences were selected using this procedure, 
its stems (14 in all) were given to another group of raters 
to judge for their affective meaningfulness. A procedure 
similar to that used with the rating of sentences was 
employed. An example of the instructions given to these 
raters is presented in Appendix D. This was done to 
determine the type of stem-predicate combination a given 
stem was involved in (see above for a discussion of the 
possible bias due to the variations in the stem-predicate 
combinations). Again, an agreement between three raters was 
required to retain a given stem on the lists. All 14 stems 
met this criterion. 
Unfortunately, this selection process resulted in the 
uneven number of stem-word completion combinations. Pre-
testing also revealed that dropping the number of sentences 
to 12 would make this task considerably easier. There were 
no more available sentences to increase the number to 16. 
This disparity was not a crucial blow to the design since 
the score most likely to be affected by this inequality --
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the match/error score was a ratio score already due to other 
considerations (see above). Thus, since the only way this 
inequality could effect the results was by affording more 
opportunities to provide correct word completions to a group 
of stem-word combinations, the use of ratio scores preempted 
this criticism. This was the case because what was compared 
was the proportion of matches rather than the actual number 
of correct guesses of affective quality of word completions 
or the actual number of words similar to the word comple-
tions. In regard to the trial to criterion scores, this 
disparity could be considered a factor, since the analysis 
of this score did not make differentiations in terms of 
stem-word combinations. The number of positive and negative 
sentences was equal at seven. 
The word completions for these sentences were also 
checked for appearance in the standing language structure 
using Thorndike and Lorge (1944) norms. These are presented 
in the Appendix B. Except for one pair of word completions 
(active [rating A] and passive [rating 7]) all other word 
completions for a given sentence were equal in terms of 
their word frequencies. 
Procedure 
Testing was conducted individually in a small labora-
tory room with the experimenter present to assist with the 
operations of the IBM personal computer and to answer ques-
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tions pertaining to the instructions. Each subject was 
scheduled at least 10 minutes after the previous subject was 
expected to complete the task. 
Subjects were told that this experiment was a learning 
task that involved memorizing a list of sentences and that 
it was not a test of their competence. They were further 
informed that they were free to discontinue the experiment 
at any point they wished without incurring any penalty. 
Following their informed consent, subjects were asked 
if they ever had worked on a computer. The "enter" key was 
pointed out to all subjects, and they were asked to press 
the key several times to familiarize themselves with its 
location. 
The procedure was first demonstrated by the experi-
menter using sentences "In athletics, John is graceful," 
and "When it comes to dancing, John is clumsy." Subjects 
were not informed regarding the affective valence of these 
sentences, or the word-completions. The order of presenta-
tion was randomized by the program, but for the sake of 
clarity, the above order will be used in this discussion. 
Before the sentences appeared on the computer screen, 
subjects were told that this was an example of a learning 
trial and they were to try to memorize the sentence that 
would appear. At this time, the task of providing the 
omitted predicate was explained to the subjects. Subjects 
were also informed that the actual list would be much longer 
and that only one learning trial would be used during the 
actual experiment, though correct responses would be given 
if they made a mistake. 
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Following the demonstration of the learning trial, the 
demonstration of the test trial began. Only the stem ap-
peared on the screen, along with a timer counting down from 
five seconds. The experimenter entered the first letter of 
the predicate "graceful" to illustrate that the timer would 
stop once a subject began to enter a word. The screen loca-
tions of the stem, the timer, as well as the location where 
subjects' entry would appear were pointed out. The ex-
perimenter proceeded to misspell the predicate (e.g., "grc-
ful"). Subjects were told that this task was not a test of 
their typing ability and were shown how to change the spell-
ing of the word using the backspace key. They were also in-
structed not to change the word itself. Once the spelling 
of the word was corrected, the experimenter pressed the 
"enter" key. The program responded with a "good job!" mes-
sage appearing on the screen. 
When, the next sentence stem ("When it comes to 
dancing, John is ..• ") appeared on the screen, the ex-
perimenter stopped the timer by entering a random set of 
digits in lieu of the word completion, thus committing an 
intentional error. At this point, the tasks required of the 
subjects after they had failed to provide a correct predi-
cate were explained. 
For the Affective Judgment condition, subjects were 
instructed to guess the affective quality of the word they 
could not recall by typing in 11 P11 or "N" at the program 
prompt. The experimenter then asked the subjects what 
letter (P or N) he should enter. 
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For the Similarity Judgment condition subjects were 
instructed to type in the first word coming to mind that 
they thought was similar to the one they could not recall. 
Again, subjects were informed that the timer would stop as 
soon as they started typing. Subjects were also asked not 
to change the word once they started typing, and not to 
enter the correct word if they happened to remember it on 
the second try. All these admonitions were conveyed during 
this demonstration. 
Following this demonstration by the experimenter, sub-
jects were asked to practice the procedure using the same 
two warm up sentences for at least three test trials. After 
their questions were answered, the actual experiment began. 
The subjects were debriefed after they had completed the 
full experimental procedure. 
CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
Trials to Criterion Scores 
The first dependent variable in this experiment was 
the trials to criterion scores. The raw data of these 
scores are presented in Appendix E. As the reader may re-
call, this score signified the number of trials it took a 
subject to reach the criterion of two errorless trials 
(including the two errorless trials) for each type of 
sentence (positive and negative). A higher value of this 
score indicated more trials were needed to learn a sublist 
of a particular type of sentences. These scores were in-
tended to test hypothesis 4, which predicted that postive 
sentences would be easier to learn than negative sentences; 
thus, it would take fewer trials to reach criterion for 
positive sentences than for negative sentences. 
The trials to criterion scores were analyzed with 2 
between-subjects (task: Affective Judgment versus Similarity 
Judgment) by 2 within-subjects (type of sentence: positive 
versus negative) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The BMDP2V program was used to compute the ANOVA. 
The ANOVA source table is presented in Table 2 and the means 
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and standard deviations are cited in Table 3. The 
inequality of the number of subjects was due to the software 
failure described above. This inequality was random, and 
was taken into account as such by the computational program. 
As shown by Table 2, the ANOVA yielded no significant 
main effect, nor interactions. Consequently, we are unable 
to reject a null hypothesis framed in terms of hypothesis 4. 
No advantage was found for positive over negative affective 
assessment. 
Match-Ratio Scores 
The second dependent variable in this experiment was 
the match-ratio scores (see Appendix E for raw data). As 
noted above, the match-ratio scores were computed by divid-
ing the number of matches by the total number of oppor-
tunities to make a match (i.e., the sum of matches and non-
matches). Thus, the match-ratio scores represented the 
subjects' accuracy in either stating the correct affective 
quality of a sentence completion in the Affective Judgment 
condition, or providing a word similar to the sentence com-
pletion in the Similarity Judgment condition. The higher 
values of the match-matio scores signified greater accuracy 
in the latter judgments. 
source of 
variance 
Judgment 
Condition 
Error(l) 
Sentence 
Type 
Sentence 
Type X 
Judgment 
Condition 
Error(2) 
Table 2 
source Table For the Analysis of Variance 
of Trials to Criterion Scores 
Sum of 
Squares 
5.49 
167.47 
0.21 
0.47 
48.75 
1 
44 
1 
1 
44 
Mean 
Square 
5.49 
3.81 
0.2 
0.47 
1.11 
1.4 ns 
0.19 ns 
0.43 ns 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Trial to Criterion Scores 
Experimental conditions mean std. dv. 
Af f ectiye Judgment 
Sentence type 
Positive 
Negative 
Similarity Judgment 
Sentence type 
Positive 
Negative 
4.68 
4.92 
4.33 
4.29 
1.75 
1.66 
1.32 
1.45 
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The match-ratio scores were used to test hypotheses 1, 
2, and 3. The independent variables involved in the test 
of these hypothesis were the affective valence of the 
sentence stems (positive or negative), the affective valence 
of the word completions (positive or negative) and the 
judgment tasks (Affective Judgment and Similarity Judgment). 
The match-ratio scores were submitted to a 2 between 
(judgment task: Affective Judgment versus Similarity Judg-
ment) by 2 within (affective valence of the stems: positive 
versus negative) by 2 within (affective valence of the word 
completions: positive versus negative) repeated measures 
ANOVA. The ANOVA was computed using the BMDP2V program. 
The source table for this ANOVA is presented in Table 4, and 
means and standard deviations for the independent variables 
are presented in Table 5. As noted above, the inequality 
in the number of subjects for Affective Judgment and 
Similarity Judgment conditions was due to software failures, 
and thus was a random effect, accounted for by the computa-
tional program. 
Since the match-ratio scores were proportions, they 
were transformed using an arcsine transformation to equate 
the distance between the data points (see Winer, 1971). 
These transformed match-ratio scores were submitted to the 
same ANOVA as the raw match-ratio scores. The source table 
for the ANOVA of transformed match-ratio scores is presented 
in Table 6. The transformed means and standard deviations 
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for the independent variables are cited in Table 7. 
As can be seen in Table 4, the ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect only for the judgment task variables 
(£(1,44]=8.87, n >.005) The same pattern of results was ob-
tained for the transformed scores. (£(1,44]=8.40, 
n >.001) (see Table 6). Since, the raw match-ratio scores 
are more discriptive of the subjects' performance than the 
transformed match-ratio scores, and the significant pattern 
of results was identical for nontransformed and transformed 
scores, the results will be discussed in terms of raw match-
ratio scores. 
Thus, the obtained results indicate that on the 
average, subjects in the Affective Judgment condition 
were more likely to accurately state the affective valence 
of the word completions than subjects in the Similarity 
Judgment condition were able to provide a similar word (X 
(Affective Judgment) =.741 >-X (Similarity Judgment) =485). 
Thus, the results lend support only to hypothesis 3 by 
showing the predicted difference between the Affective 
Judgment and the Similarity Judgment conditions. 
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Table 4 
Source Table for the Analysis of Variance of 
Raw Match-Ratio Scores 
source Sum of D.F. Mean 
.E 
of Variance Squares Squares 
Judgment 
Task 2.97 1 2.97 8.87 .0047 
Error Term 14.75 44 .34 
Sentence Stem .03 1 .03 .30 ns 
Sentence Stem 
by Judgment 
Task .05 1 .05 .48 ns 
Error Term 4.21 44 .09 
Word 
Completion .08 1 .08 .55 ns 
word Completion 
by Judgment 
Task .17 1 .17 1.16 ns 
Error Term 6.62 44 .15 
Sentence 
Completion 
by Word 
Completion .02 1 .02 .22 ns 
Sentence 
Completion 
by Word 
Completion 
by Judgment 
Task .18 1 .18 2.14 ns 
Error Term 3.66 44 .08 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Raw Match Ratio Scores 
Experimental Groups Mean Std. Dev. 
1) Positive Stem, Positive 
Word Completion 
Affective Judgment .788 .318 
Similarity Judgment .440 .449 
2) Positive Stem, Negative 
Word Completion 
Affective Judgment .686 .418 
Similarity Judgment .587 .467 
3) Negative Stem, Positive 
Word Completion 
Affective Judgment .712 .352 
Similarity Judgment .426 .476 
4) Negative Stem, Negative 
Word Completion 
Affective Judgment .776 .311 
Similarity Judgment .488 .469 
Table 6 
The Source Table of the Analysis of Variance 
of the Transformed Match-Ratio Scores 
source of 
Variance 
Judgment 
Task 
Error 
Sentence Stem 
Sentence Stem 
by Judgment 
Task 
Error 
Word 
Completion 
Word 
Completion 
by Judgment 
Task 
Error 
Sentence Stem 
by Word 
Completion 
Sentence Stem 
by Word 
Completion by 
Judgment Task 
Error 
Sum of Mean 
Squares D.F. Square 
27.16 1 27.16 8.4 
142.34 44 3.23 
.22 1 22 .25 
.27 1 .27 .30 
39.67 44 .90 
.84 1 .84 .60 
1.92 1 1.92 1.35 
62.44 44 1.42 
.14 1 .14 .18 
1.33 1 1.33 1.77 
33.35 44 .75 
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.0001 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviation for 
the Transformed Match-Ratio Scores 
Experimental Groups Mean Std.Dev. 
1) Positive Stem, Positive 
Word Completion 
Affective Judgment 2.46 .95 
Similarity Judgment 1.39 1.40 
2) Positive Stem, Negative 
Word Completion 
Affective Judgment 2.17 1.31 
Similarity Judgment 1.85 1.46 
3) Negative Stem, Negative 
Word Completion 
Affective Judgment 2.24 1. 06 
Similarity Judgment 1.36 1.49 
4) Negative Stem, Negative 
Word Completion 
Affective Judgment 2.41 .92 
similarity Judgment 1.59 1.43 
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As one may recall, hypothesis 1 predicted that sub-
jects in the Affective Judgment condition would be more 
accurate in guessing the affective valence of a word com-
pleting a positive sentence than a word completing a nega-
tive sentence. Hypothesis 2 predicted that subjects in the 
similarity Judgment condition would be more likely to 
provide a word similar to a word completing a positive 
sentence than to a word completing a negative sentence. 
Since, the word completion of a sentence determined the 
affective quality of a sentence, these hypotheses predicted 
a main effect for the word completion variables where the 
accuracy for positive word completion would be greater than 
the accuracy for negative sentences for both Affective 
Judgment and Similarity Judgment conditions. 
Since no main effect for the word completion variable 
was obtained, the results did not support hypotheses 1 and 
2. According to these results, contrary to prediction of 
hypothesis 1, subjects in the Affective Judgment condition 
were no more likely to accurately state the affective 
valence of the words completing the positive sentences than 
those completing the negative sentences. Contrary to the 
prediction of hypothesis 2, in the Similarity Judgment 
condition, subjects were no more likely to provide a word 
similar to one completing a positive sentence than to one 
completing a negative sentence. 
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Chi Sguare Analyses 
chi Sguare of Match Freguencies in Affective Judgment 
~ondition. An argument can be made that the pattern of 
scores obtained in support of hypothesis 3, were due to the 
limitation of the response alternatives for the Affective 
Judgment condition, while no such limitation existed for the 
Similarity Judgment condition. Namely, the subjects in the 
Affective Judgment condition were presented with two 
alternatives for a response -- "P" for "positive," or "N" 
for negative. On the other hand, subjects in the Similarity 
Judgment condition who had to generate their own responses 
were faced with a potentially unlimited number of 
alternatives. Thus, it could be argued that the difference 
in match-ratio scores between the Affective Judgment condi-
tion and the Similarity Judgment condition was due to the 
higher probability of subjects in the Affective Judgment 
condition arriving at a "correct" response. 
This argument was already taken into consideration in 
the procedure of selecting sentences for this experiment. 
That is, we required that the raters provide at least three 
synonyms to word completions of all the sentences selected, 
thus increasing the probability of a similar response being 
available. An additional counter-argument can be made by 
presenting evidence that the pattern of responses obtained 
for the Affective Judgment condition was not due to chance 
alone. Since, the subjects in this condition were faced 
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with dichotomous alternatives, the chance probability is 
thus .5 or 50%. 
To test that the match scores for Affective Judgment 
condition were not obtained by chance alone, a chi square 
was performed comparing the observed frequency of matches 
(because there was no effect for the word completion and the 
sentence stem variables: both positive and negative matches 
were summed together) with the value expected under the pro-
bability of .5 (or 50%) to make a match. The frequencies 
used are presented below in Table 8. The analysis yielded'): 
2 (1, H= 131)= 11.62, which was significant at R<.01. 
Thus, we can conclude that the pattern of match-ratio 
scores obtained for the Affective Judgment condition was not 
due to chance alone. Since, we can now begin to rule out 
the possibility that the subjects simply guessed the 
affective quality of the word completion, we have evidence 
to suggest that the obtained pattern of results for match-
ratio scores in the Affective Judgment condition reflects 
the postulated ability to anticipate the affective quality 
of the word completions, and hence, lends support to the 
predicational model presented above. Here, we find evidence 
that the affective predication of the sentence completion 
had an effect, beyond that expected due to chance alone. 
Table 8 
Observed and Expected Freguencies for Matches 
for the Affective Judgment Condition 
observed Frequency of Matches ••••...•••• 85 
Expected Frequency of Matches .....•••... 65.5 
Observed Frequency of Nonmatches ..••.••• 46 
Expected Frequency of Nonmatches •.••.... 65.5 
Total Number of Observations ...••••...•• 131 
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Tbe Cbi Sguare Analysis of Freguencies of "Affective" 
Matcbes in Similarity Judgment Condition. Additional 
support for the hypothesis that affective predication had an 
effect on the subjects' ability to anticipate the affective 
quality of the word completions can be derived by looking at 
the correspondence of affective quality of the "similar" 
responses provided by subjects in the Similarity Judgment 
condition with affective quality of the word completions. 
In view of the above discussions of affective predication, 
we would expect that the affective predication of the 
sentence would determine the generation of the "similar" 
responses along the same affective dimension. For instance, 
we would predict that the "similar" responses to a sentence 
stem "In solving problems, John is ••. 11 which is completed by 
a positive "fast," would also be positive, even when a "sim-
ilar" response is not related to the actual word completion 
in other ways (e.g., "friendly" and/or "brilliant"). Thus, 
we would expect the frequency of correspondence between the 
affective quality of the "similar" responses with the 
affective quality of the sentence completion (i.e., the 
frequency of "affective" matches) to be above that expected 
by chance alone. As was the case in the above chi square 
analysis, the frequency expected by chance alone would be 
50% of all responses. 
To test this hypothesis, the same group of raters who 
evaluated the subjects' "similar" responses in terms of 
"similarity" with the sentence completions also scored the 
subjects' "similar" responses in terms of the affective 
dimensions of "positive" and "negative." The instructions 
given to these raters were as follow: 
"Please indicate if you think that the following 
items are positive or negative in meaning by 
checking off "P" for positive and "N" for nega-
tive. Please rate items one at a time, and go 
by your first impression." 
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As was the case for "similarity" judgment, the cor-
respondence between the affective valence assigned to a 
subject's response by four or more raters, and the affective 
valence of the word completion of a sentence to which the 
response was made, defined an "affective" match. 
For instance, assume that a subject responded with 
"wonderful" when cued with the stem "When solving problems, 
John is •.• ," but the actual word completion here was 
suppose to be "fast." The word "fast" was positive. If 
four or more judges rated "wonderful" as positive, then we 
would consider "wonderful" to affectively match "fast," des-
pite the fact that there is no other apparent semantic 
relationship between them. 
These "affective" match scores were analyzed with a 
chi square to see if their frequency was significantly 
different from the value expected by a chance probability of 
50 %. The frequencies analyzed are presented in Table 9. 
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An analysis yielded a X 2 ( 2, lf=92 )=21. 04, p,. <. 01. 
Based on this analysis, we can conclude that the 
frequency of "affective" matches was not due to chance 
alone. These results further support the counter-argument 
made in the previous section. Not only can we conclude that 
subjects were able to state the affective quality of the 
sentence completions when directly asked to do so in the 
Affective Judgment condition, but now we also have an in-
direct measure of the same effect. Thus, we have addi-
tional evidence in support of the predicational model 
proposed under test. 
Table 9 
Observed and Expected Frequencies for Affective Matches 
For the Similarity Judgment Condition 
Observed Frequency of Matches ••••••...•• 68 
Expected Frequency of Matches .•••••••••• 46 
Observed Frequency of Nonmatches •...•••• 24 
Expected Frequency of Nonmatches ••••••.• 46 
Total Number of Observations ••.••.•••••• 92 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
The main finding of this study is the difference 
between group match scores; as predicted in hypothesis 3. 
Subjects were more likely to anticipate the affective 
quality of the predicate than to provide a similar word. In 
view of the theoretical framework laid out in Chapters III 
and IV, these results indicate that a subject knew the 
affective sense of the predicate before the exact word was 
learned. This, conclusion is further supported by the trend 
in the subjects' responses to provide an affectively similar 
word to the actual predicate in the Similarity Judgment 
condition as indicated by the chi square analysis of 
frequency of "affective" matches. The affective quality 
thus represents a broad organizing structure that allows one 
to draw the relationship between items, even when no other 
relationship exists. 
For example, in some cases, the similar responses were 
word completions of other sentences having the same 
affective quality. This pattern of errors further supports 
the notion that the items were predicated in terms of their 
affective quality, and hence, are more likely to be inter-
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changed within the same affective context regardless of the 
specifics of their meaning. On the other hand, the specific 
relations between words may become apparent only after the 
word is put into the context which it shares with a limited 
number of other similar items. Affect may be too broad of a 
conceptual category to bring these relationships out. Thus, 
if the learning is a top-to-bottom process as it is claimed 
here, one would be cognizant of the affective quality of the 
words before they would be aware of the specific relations 
which facilitate the ability to state a similar word. 
As was noted above, one may argue that the limitation 
of response alternatives for the Affective Judgment condi-
tion to positive and negative versus the potentially un-
limited number of possible responses for the Similarity 
Judgment condition had an effect. Thus, the results ob-
tained are the reflection of a fact that in the subjects in 
the Affective Judgment condition had at least a 50% chance 
of responding correctly (matching the actual affective va-
lence of the sentence completion) while for the subjects in 
the Similarity Judgment condition, the chance of providing a 
similar word would be smaller. This is a formidable chal-
lenge, but it was countered in three ways, and here the 
fourth will be suggested. First, the selection criterion 
for the sentences that required the raters to provide at 
least three similar words to the predicate of a sentence 
partly meets this criticism by insuring that each word used 
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had readily available alternatives. Second, given that the 
frequency of matches in Affective Judgment condition was 
well above that expected by chance alone (as was indicated 
by the chi square analysis), we can conclude that the 
performance of subjects in the Affective Judgment condition 
reflects more than mere guessing. Third, subjects in the 
Similarity Judgment condition tended to provide "similar" 
responses that were affectively similar to the sentence 
completions even when these "similar" responses did not meet 
the other criterion of similarity. As was noted above, this 
evidence is another indication that subjects had a "hunch" 
about the affective quality of the word completions. 
Fourth, the lack of the simple main effect for the 
type of sentence variable in the Affective Judgment condi-
tion is actually encouraging. Any pattern of scores other 
than those predicted by hypotheses 1 and 2 (i.e., PP=NP> 
NN=PN) or its opposite (i.e., PP=NP<NN=PN that would suggest 
RV reversal effect), would have indicated that stem-word 
combinations had an effect beyond the positive or negative 
evaluation of the sentences. Especially damaging would have 
been an interaction in which the scores for PP and NN 
sentences were higher than PN and NP scores. This would 
imply that the obtained main effect for the group variable 
might have been due to the fact that subjects simply guessed 
the affective valence of the predicate based upon the affec-
tive valence of the stem. 
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A related issue is that the tasks between conditions 
differed in terms of difficulty. In the case of the 
Affective Judgment condition, the task simply required the 
subjects to indentify the correct response between the pre-
sented alternatives (i.e., positive or negative). In the 
case of the Similarity Judgment condition, subjects had to 
generate their own responses. This point is well taken and 
future research should take into account this distinction by 
equating these tasks. For instance, the subjects in the 
Similarity Judgment condition could be given a choice of a 
word similar to the actual word and an unrelated word. 
Another methodological criticism of these results can 
be made in view of the disparity of stem-word combinations, 
an unfortunate situation that arose due the selection 
processes of the material used in this experiment. This 
criticism can be countered in two ways. First, the dis-
parity differed between lists, and these were randomly 
assigned. Given that list A had more NP and PN than NN and 
PP sentences and list B had more NN and PP than PN and NP 
sentences, the average number of stem-predicate combinations 
was identical when calculated across lists. Second, the 
match-ratio score was a percentage of correct responses over 
the opportunities to make these responses. The stated 
reason why a ratio score was used thus counters this 
possible criticism. The difference in the number of errors 
made by ~~~jects was aq~icipated by hypothesis 4 which pre-
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dieted that the negative sentences would be harder to learn 
than the positive sentences. Thus the percentage score was 
used to obtain a metric of subjects' performance not in-
fluenced by this predicted disparity in the number of 
responses for different types of material. Therefore, the 
use of a ratio score should also equate subjects' scores in 
this situation where the number of opportunities to make an 
error was not equal. 
Another objection that can be raised to question 
these results concerns the relations between subjects' ini-
tial responses and those after the prompt (either to state 
the affective quality or to provide a similar word). One 
may postulate that the obtained matches (either in the 
Affective Judgment condition or affective matches in Simi-
larity Judgment condition) were the result of subjects 
altering their responses following an error and thus were 
indicative of the feedback provided by the experimental pro-
cedure and not their knowledge of the affective quality per 
se. For instance, a subject could have scored a match by 
stating that a word completion was positive after incor-
rectly responding with a negative word (e.g., dumb) to a 
sentence stem "When solving problems, John is __ .," where 
the actual word completion was a positive "fast." 
The pattern of scores suggests that such reversals of 
affective quality were infrequent. For in-
stance, out of 85 matches scored in the Affective Judgment 
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condition, 52 were made following a failure to respond 
within five second (thus following a "blank"), 24 coincided 
with the affective quality of the initial erroneous response 
(e.g, stating that word completion [e.g., fast] was positive 
after initially responding with "smart") and only nine were 
the reversals described above. For affective matches scored 
by subjects in the Similarity Judgment condition, 10 were 
reversals, 17 coincided with the initial response and 41 
were blanks. Caution should be exercised in interpreting 
these findings, since no formal procedure was used to rate 
the affective valence of the initial responses. Even so, 
the tendency of subjects not to reverse the affective 
valence of their initial responses suggests that the 
feedback given by the experimental procedure was not an 
important factor. 
Futhermore, this pattern of results lends additional 
support to the predicational model. The contrast between 
the frequencies of "reversal" of affective quality following 
the initial response and "nonreversal" of affective quality 
(9 vs. 24 for the Affective Judgment condition and 10 vs. 17 
for the Similarity Judgment condition) suggests that the 
initial predication of the affective quality guided both 
responses -- the initial response and the response following 
the prompt to either state the affective quality of the 
sentence completion or to state a similar word. In fact, 
for the Affective Judgment condition, this pattern remained 
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even when the subjects' initial impressions were wrong. For 
instance when subjects in the Affective Judgment condition 
did not score a match (i.e., responded "negatively" to a 
positive sentence), they reversed the affective valence of 
their initial responses four times and failed to do so 28 
times, thus lending further support to this hypothesis. The 
pattern of responses for Similarity Judgment condition was 
not clear, since most failures to score an affective match 
came after "blanks," but when these came after erroneous 
responses, five were reversals and four were nonreversals. 
It is also interesting to note that for all six cases 
in the Affective Judgment condition and for the two cases in 
the Similarity Judgment condition when the initial response 
was an antonym to the actual word completion (e.g., cautious 
to careless), subjects did not score a match. This trend 
in subjects' responses is significant in view of the opposi-
tional nature of the predicational process proposed in 
Chapters III and IV. Some antonyms can be viewed as re-
presenting the opposite poles of affective valence as well 
being opposite in terms of some dimensions of meaning 
(Hampton & Taylor, 1985; Glass, Holyoak & Kriger, 1979; 
Herrmann, Chaffin, Conti, Peters & Robbins, 1979). For 
instance "innocent" and "guilty" are opposite in terms of 
their affective connotation, but are also opposite in terms 
of the representation of the judgment rendered. Thus, the 
relation between antonyms is closer than the relation 
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between words opposite solely on the affective dimension 
(e.g., cautious and guilty). In terms of this study, this 
suggests that the subjects had an inkling of the meaning of 
the actual word, but failed to respond correctly because of 
the erroneous affective predication. The failure to reverse 
the initial affective predication in case of antonymy 
implies that as postulated by hypothesis 3, affect rather 
than meaning played a key role in determining the nature of 
the subsequent responses. 
The alternative explanation to these results made in 
terms of the Lockean tradition would stress the associative 
relation between the item and its value label. In order to 
account for the above results, a Lockean model would have to 
either a) postulate the salience of the item-affective label 
association or b) specify the conditions under which this 
relation is salient. In regard to the first point, there is 
no evidence that such is the case. The value labels per se 
(i.e., good, bad, etc.) do not generally appear as high as-
sociates on the norms of free association frequencies (see 
Palermo & Jenkins, 1964). In fact, if the process involved 
in this task was guided strictly by the associative stre-
ngth, we would expect a reversal of the results. 
On the other hand, a Lockean model may postulate that 
the instructions given to the subjects in the Affective 
Judgment condition primed the affective labels, thus spe-
cifying the condition when the relation with these labels 
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ought to be accessible. Yet, the reverse may be true for 
the Similarity Judgment condition. Thus, the Lockean model 
is faced with the challenge of explaining why one type of 
priming is superior to another. 
Again, given the theoretical tenets of the Lockean 
tradition, one would have to rely on the mediational mode of 
explanation. For instance, one can speculate that the 
associative links between items and affective nodes are at a 
higher level in the associative network. This type of post 
hoc explanation relying on the level in the associative 
network was used by Glass, Holyak and Kriger (1979) in 
interpreting antonymy effects. 
Citing the hierarchical levels in the network could 
also account for the trend that in the Similarity Judgment 
condition, subjects tended to provide words with the same 
affective valence as those actually completing the senten-
ces. The predicational model would, of course, predict 
these results noting that the choices of erroneous items 
were guided by the subjects' predications of the meaningful-
ness of the actual words. Thus, I must concede that the 
more advanced Lockean models can account for this finding 
given proper modifications, but as was noted by Chang 
(1986), such models, have so much flexibility in their 
theoretical constructs that they can account for almost any 
phenomenon. The predicational model has an advantage of ac-
counting for this result parsimoniously, expecting the ob-
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tained pattern of scores based upon its theoretical tenets. 
The results did not show the predicted main effect of 
the type of sentence for trial to criterion scores. The 
most probable statistical culprit is the lack of variance. 
It took subjects on the average 4.57 trials to reach the 
learning criterion for the whole list. This indicates that 
the lists were too simple and thus too readily learned to 
capture the possible difference between the positive and the 
negative sentences (Labertaux, 1968). 
Another plausible explanation of this failure to find 
the predicted main effect refers back to the influence of 
the subjects' predication of the task on their performance. 
This study also differs from the previous research on 
affective assessment in that experimental material was 
presented on a computer. The experimenter observed that 
subjects were more or less evenly split in terms of their 
familiarity with the computer. Although there are no data 
to assess the relationship between one's familiarity with an 
apparatus and his/her attitude toward the task, it is a pos-
sibility that those less familiar with the apparatus might 
have had a negative predication of the task itself and thus 
learned along the negative dimension (see Rychlak & Marceil, 
in press). Therefore, the predicted RV-positive effect was 
"washed out." Given the field's increasing reliance on 
computer generated presentations of experimental material, 
this topic should be investigated in some detail. 
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Still another issue is that unlike previous research 
on affective assessment, subjects were not required to rate 
the material themselves. The assumption of the correspon-
dence between the nomothetic rating of items in terms of 
"positive" or "negative," and the subject's idiographic 
affective assessment of the items' meaningfulness should be 
explored further. This issue may be strictly procedural, 
pertaining to how the instructions for raters and subjects 
are worded. The sentences used here were written to convey 
evaluative information about "John" and without an apprecia-
tion of this meaning, the sentences are meaningless. The 
raters were asked to state if the sentences conveyed a 
positive or negative impression of "John," and the subjects 
were asked to simply state if the word completion was posi-
tive or negative. Hence, the task used in this experiment 
might have required raters and subjects to predicate the 
sentences in terms of an evaluative dimension that was 
semantic, rather than affective in the sense of meaning-
fulness. As meaning, the evaluative dimension may be a 
reflection of societal norms or linguistic convention for 
conveying the sense of "positive" or "negative," rather 
than a sense of personal significance or importance. The 
distinction between "evaluative meaning" and meaningfulness 
could be viewed in terms of the dimension of objectivity as 
well as a matter of purpose. In the case of "evaluative 
meaning" sequacious extension of meaning is for the sake of 
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understanding the sentence, rather than for the sake of its 
personal value or significance. Thus, if the purpose is to 
understand, both positive and negative meanings are equally 
important and we would not find the expected RV positive 
effect. The variations in the presented instruction would 
help to investigate this question. 
Based on the findings of this study that affective 
quality of the items were known before the actual items were 
learned, there is evidence to suggest that the predicational 
process was involved regardless of whether this was a case 
of affective meaningfulness or evaluative meaning. In 
either case, the affective quality of the word can be 
construed as the broad conceptual structure lending meaning 
to the items learned, and/or determining the pattern of 
responses. As was discussed above, a number of methodologi-
cal and theoretical issues challenge this interpretation of 
the results. Some of the methodological issues were 
countered with anecdotal evidence and thus warrant further 
investigation. The theoretical issues are harder to resolve 
since they are based on assumptions that go beyond the logic 
of the empirical validation of the hypotheses. In regard to 
these, one must invoke the principles of parsimony. The 
predicational model provides a clear explanation of the 
results presented here, since they are predicted by the 
model itself based upon its assumption pertaining to the 
nature of the cognitive process. 
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APPENDIX A 
Instruction Given to Raters Making Judgement of Semantic 
Relatedness Between the Subjects' Responses and 
Actual Predicates 
Following is a list consisting of sentences used in a psy-
chology experiment. As you can see, the last word, the 
sentence's predicate, is underlined. Underneath each sen-
tence you will find a list of words. Please, read these 
words one at a time, and decide if a given word can be sub-
stituted for the sentence's predicate without altering the 
meaning of that sentence. If you think that a word can in 
fact be substituted in the sentence, please put a check mark 
next to it. Please repeat this procedure for each sentence 
in the list. 
APPENDIX B 
Lists of Sentences Used in the Experiment 
Their Stem-Predicate Designations and Freguency Norms 
In dangerous situations, John is careful. (A) NP 
careless (A) NN 
If fault is assigned, John is innocent. (41) NP 
guilty (38) NN 
When others are in trouble, John is concerned.(11) NP 
uncaring (10) NN 
On a rainy day, John is happy.(AA) 
sad (A) 
NP 
NN 
In solving problems, John is fast. (AA) 
slow (A) 
PP 
PN 
When competing with others, John 
When eating, John is neat. (29) 
messy (17) 
When bad things are likely, John 
is active (A) 
passive (7) 
is unlucky.(24) 
lucky (24) 
PP 
PN 
pp 
PN 
NN 
NP 
When others are rude, John is impolite (20) NN 
polite (10) NP 
When watching a movie, John is loud.(A) PN 
quiet (A) PP 
If schedule must be kept, John is tardy. (7) PN 
prompt (19) PP 
When it comes to money, John is stingy. (1) PN 
generous (40) PP 
When attending a party, John is timid.(15) PN 
outgoing(l) PP 
When life gets strained, John is tense (A) NN 
relaxed (A) NP 
Thorndike and Lorge norms are in parenthesis 
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APPENDIX C 
Instructions Given to the Raters 
Judging the Affective Valence of the Sentences 
Following is a list of sentences that state something 
about a fictitious person named John. As you read each 
sentence, please indicate if you feel that a sentence makes 
a positive or a negative statement about John. We have pro-
vided a scale at the end of each sentence, so all you will 
have to do is to circle P if you feel that a sentence makes 
a positive statement, or N if you feel that a sentence makes 
a negative statement. We ask you to rate each sentence one 
at a time as you go down the list and not to correct your 
initial rating. 
As you rate each sentence, you will notice that the 
last word of each sentence is underlined. Once you have 
finished rating every sentence on the list, please, go back 
to the beginning and try to write down as many synonyms to 
the underlined word in each sentence as you can within ap-
proximately one minute. To do so use the blank space below 
each sentence. As before, work on one sentence at a time. 
Once, you have finished writing synonyms for the underlined 
word in a given sentence, do not return to that word once 
you have begun working on the word in the next sentence. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE YOU START? 
APPENDIX D 
Instructions Given to Raters Making a Judgment Regarding 
the Affective Valence of the Sentence Stems 
101 
Following is a list of phrases we took from a list we 
are planning to use in an experiment. As you read each 
phrase, please indicate if you feel that this phrase makes a 
positive or a negative statement. We have provided a scale 
at the end of each sentence, so all you will have to do is 
to circle P if you feel that a sentence makes a positive 
statement, or N if you feel that a sentence makes a negative 
statement. We ask you to rate one sentence at a time as you 
go down the list and not to correct your initial rating. 
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APPENDIX E 
Raw Scores 
Affective Judgment Condition 
S# TTC* Match-Ratio Scores 
P(a) N(b) PP(c) PN(d)NP(e)NN(f) 
1 6 4 1.00 0 1. 00 0.40 
2 6 5 0.17 0.50 1.00 1.00 
3 5 4 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 
4 8 7 0.50 0 0.43 0.50 
5 3 4 1. 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 4 4 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 
7 7 7 o. 0.33 0.83 0.80 
8 3 5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
9 3 4 0.50 1.00 0.4 1.00 
10 3 3 1.00 0.33 0.25 1.00 
11 6 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
12 4 5 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 
13 4 2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
14 4 4 0.43 0.50 0.25 0.40 
16 6 5 0.75 0 0.75 0.86 
17 9 8 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.83 
18 3 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
19 3 6 0.14 1.00 1.00 0.25 
20 3 2 0.83 0 0.57 0 
21 5 5 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.85 
22 6 6 0.67 1.00 0.33 0.80 
23 5 8 1.00 0 1.00 0.20 
24 4 6 1.00 1. 00 1.00 1.00 
25 5 5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
mean 4.68 4.92 mean .79 .69 .71 .78 
Note: 
*) TTC stands for Trials to criterion scores 
a) P signifies Positive sentences 
b) N signifies Negative sentences 
c) PP signifies Positive stem, Positive word completion 
d) PN signifies Positive stem, Negative word completion 
e) NP signifies Negative stem, Positive word completion 
f) NN signifies Negative stem, Negative word completion 
Similarity Judgment Condition 
S# 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
mean 
Note: 
TTC* 
P(a) 
7 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
6 
4 
5 
5 
5 
6 
5 
5 
6 
2 
3 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4.33 
N(b) 
7 
5 
3 
2 
3 
5 
6 
5 
4 
3 
5 
6 
5 
5 
6 
3 
5 
2 
4 
4 
2 
4.29 mean 
Match-ratio scores 
PP(c)PN(d)NP(e)NN(f) 
0.33 
1.00 
0 
1.00 
0.12 
0 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
0.66 
0 
0 
1.00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.50 
0 
0 
0 
1.00 
0 
0.33 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
0.50 
0 
0 
0 
1.00 
1. 00 
1.00 
0.50 
0 
0.25 
1.00 
1.00 
0.20 
1.00 
0 
1.00 
0 
0.25 
1.00 
0.50 
1.00 
0.50 
0 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.50 
0.20 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
0.12 
0.15 
0 
1.00 
0 
0.25 
0 
0 
1.00 
1.00 
0 
0.33 
1.00 
0 
1. 00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.44 0.59 0.43 0.49 
*) TTC stands for Trials to crit4rion scores 
a) P signifies Positive sentences 
b) N signifies Negative sentences 
c) PP signifies Positive stem, Positive word completion 
d) PN signifies Positive stem, Negative word completion 
e) NP signifies Negative stem, Positive word completion 
f) NN signifies Negative stem, Negative word completion 
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